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PREFACE
Initially, I intended to explore the prospect of employing U.S. 
food power to compel OPEC to enact more reasonable oil policies or 
"A Bushel for a Barrel" as the objective of my professional paper. 
However, as I read the materials on food issues, I became struck 
with the devastating impact such a policy, which would necessarily 
include a grain cartel, would have on the poor nations of the world. 
In fact, I found that a tremendous world food crisis already exists. 
At this point I became interested in the world problem of hunger 
and steps that could be taken to alleviate it. Bearing the field 
of public administration in mind, I concentrated my efforts on 
examining what agencies have been doing to deal with hunger.
Although political, economic and social aspects of the world 
food problem are considered, this study stresses certain admin­
istrative aspects. The hunger problem provides an excellent area 
for case study since so much has been written on hunger in the 
past ten years. However, there is little written on the field of 
international public administration itself. Since there are a 
great many agencies charged with dealing with the hunger problem, 
the administrative side of food distribution is a fertile area 
for research. If there are so many organizations dealing with 
hunger, after all, why is the problem getting worse?
I suspected that part of the reason must be mismanagement.
This, of course, cannot be labeled as the sole cause For the 
decaying situation. There are demographic, technoligical, polit­
ical and economic contributions. However, the attention of this 
study has focused on the institutional elements involved.
11
The institutional failings in the field of nutrition enhancement 
are not insurmountable and the time to act is now.
Ill
INTRODUCTION
During the past decade the world has witnessed famines in 
Bangladesh, Nigeria, the Horn of Africa, and Cambodia. Each time 
one of these catastrophes became public, an immediate cry for 
emergency aid resulted. People all over the world donated funds 
and foodstuffs to rescue the suffering masses of the contemporary 
crisis. Although the response by the wealthy nations appeared 
admirable, the need for such extraordinary measures reveals a 
very serious malady in twentieth century world politics. One 
must pose the question: why is the phenomenon of famine recurring
in such rapid succession? In a time of incredible advances in 
technology why are so many still hungry? The answers lie not in 
the ability of man to produce enough food but in the inability 
to share it efficiently.
To understand this concept, observe the remarkable gap in 
the amount of food produced and consumed in North America and 
Africa. Americans throw out a huge amount of food annually while 
there is massive starvation in Africa. From this fact one must 
draw two conclusions. First, there is a lack of equitable pro­
ductive capabilities in the international community. Second, 
there is a serious failure of world markets, commercial and/or 
concessionary, to distribute equitably the food that is produced.
There have been, however, serious efforts made by the inter­
national community to alleviate the problem of world hunger.
This has been especially true since World War II. Specifically, 
under the various projects of the United Nations, large amounts
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of time and resources have been devoted to easing significantly 
world hunger. Nonetheless the malaise continues to spread and 
affect larger numbers of people. It is the intention of this 
study, first, to examine the present situation and second, to 
propose an alternative approach to alleviating the world hunger 
dilemma.
In the opening chapter, "The Global Food Dilemma," I have 
described the problem of hunger. Although it is brief, when one 
considers the scope and the complexities of the world nutrition 
status, it attempts to describe the highlights of the hunger 
crisis. Some of the flaws of what Raymond Hopkins and Donald
Puchala identify as "the global food regime" are enumerated.
It is in this chapter that the first suggestion is offered, an
international food reserve program. 1 should point out that the
problem had been researched before any proposal of changes was 
formulated and not vice versa.
Chapter 11 deals more directly with international agencies 
responsible for nutrition and some general problems in the area 
of international public administration. Chapter 111 lays out a 
proposal for reorganization of the entire effort in some detail.
1 would not be so presumptuous to claim that 1 have the only work­
able solution, but I do feel that it is a valid option.
The final two chapters describe how the proposed "International 
Nutrition Agency" will work and discusses some of the frequently 
expressed misgivings of an approach involving consolidation of 
agencies and structural changes. It may be noticed that the
concept of dependency is raised several times. Dependency is 
described as a result of foreign aid wherein recipient nations 
are less likely to develop their own productive capacities because 
it is easier to continue to receive the direct aid. The reason for 
its frequent appearance is that the issue arose many times during 
my research. Since dependency seemed the strongest argument against 
my proposal, I have treated it in several places. The world hunger 
crisis is an issue of paramount proportions that will not go away 
on its own. It is time that serious efforts be made to improve 
the potential for resolution. The International Nutrition Agency 
is designed to provide that chance.
CHAPTER I 
THE GLOBAL FOOD DILEMMA
The Problem of Hunger
In recent decades, it has become apparent that the world is 
experiencing an extensive problem of feeding its population. A 
bi-partisan presidential commission found that
hunger is one of the most serious problems of 
our time. It requires immediate steps to relieve 
the present-day suffering of millions, together with 
long-term strategies for eliminating its causes.^
The essence of the world food problem may be broken down into five 
distinct dimensions:
1. There are widespread chronic food shortages (famines and 
extreme hunger), especially in South Asia and Africa.
2. Current distributive arrangements lead to undesireable 
instability in supply.
3. Certain countries face problem of security of food imports
4. There continues to exist low productivity in agricultural 
sectors of many less developed countries (LDCs).
5. Chronic malnutrition is common in underprivileged groups 
including those in developed nations.^
The immediate problem is one of distribution of food resources. 
The long-term strategies involve agricultural development in food
^Report of the Presidential Commission of World Hunger, Sol 
M. Linowitz, chairman, (Washington, D.C., U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1980), p. 3
^Raymond F. Hopkins and Donald J. Puchala, "Perspectives on 
International Relations of Food," International Organization, 
32 (Summer 1978): 581-616
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deficit nations. Although these problems are not confined to the poorer 
nations, the most serious consequences are reflected in those nations.
For example, today in the Horn of Africa the fragility of the global 
food distribution process is most evident. Any natural or man-made dis­
aster can result in extensive famine. Famine involves massive deaths 
and should not be confused with chronic malnutrition. Famines, however, 
are a profound symptom of the global food problem. The primary emphasis
of those who are concerned with global hunger should be with chronic 
malnutrition.
According to the Presidental Commission, "The primary cause of 
world hunger is poverty."3 Because of this poverty, even in years of 
abundant harvests, many have neither the land on which to grow food nor 
the money with which to buy it. In many rural areas large numbers of 
people have little access to land, water or credit. In urban areas, 
jobs are scarce and thus income to obtain food and medical care is
scarce, largely because so many people have been forced to leave the 
countryside. Since income may Tiot be available, there is little sub­
stantial demand, resulting in local distributive problems. If markets 
have no encouragement to provide a commodity in an area, that commodity
will not be available. Inequitable distribution of resources, partic­
ularly land, is a major cause of poverty. Johnston and Kilby point out 
that
out-and-out shortages of food may be a chronic problem for 
some groups and an occasional problem for wider segments of 
society. In general, however, problems of distribution and of 
nutritional education are largely responsible for the nutritional 
problems that exist.4
3presidental Commission, World Hunger, p. 3
^Bruce F . Johnston and Peter Kilby, Agriculture and Structural 
Transformation, (New York, Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 6
In the developing nations of the world the problem is particularly 
acute. Generally, three characteristics are common to these tradi­
tional economies of LDCs.
1. The percentage of the population engaged in agriculture is 
high. Historically, it can be shown that a high proportion of labor 
in agriculture has been indicative of a low per capita output.^ As 
Erik Eckholm concludes in his article, "Value of Small Farms", it is 
evident that the distribution of land with a large portion of the 
population engaged in the agricultural sector is a critical issue 
for the problem of hunger.
Analyses of the world hunger problem consistently 
identify two imperatives: more food must be produced 
in the developing countries, and it must be more 
widely distributed. Land reform can often contribute 
to the achievement of the first goal and can always 
contribute to the achievement of the second. More 
food production alone will not eliminate hunger; nor 
will more charity. Only wider access to decent land or 
to decent jobs will give the dispossessed a chance to 
work their way out of extreme poverty and undernutrition.&
2. Productivity of this large rural group is low, placing them 
constantly on the brink of starvation.^
3. Although average consumption levels are above the subsistence 
threshold, diets are heavily weighted toward less preferred starch 
staples.
The results of these conditions are demonstrated by the following phe­
nomena in the developing world as noted by the Presidental Commission
^Johnston and Kilby, Structural Transformation, pp 76-77
^Erik Eckholm, "Value of Small Farms", Focus, 30(Jan-Feb 1980): 
11-16
^Johnston and Kilby, Structural Transformation, p.6
on World Hunger;
-Today, developing countries grow about 87 percent of their own 
food; by the end of the century this figure could fall to 74 percent 
and a tenuous capability of acquiring the balance with continued 
population growth. (See Table 1.1 for a demonstration of recent 
trends in LDC food production and imports.)
-By 1988, according to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, 
the developing world will have an annual deficit of 84 million tons 
of wheat, rice and coarse grains.
-In 1976, the developing countries spent over $10 billion to 
import food. This is equal to about 70 percent of the total 
development assistance provided by the industrialized countries in 
that year.
-One out of every eight people on earth is hungry most of the 
time.
-In many countries (e.g. Ethiopia, Bangladesh) up to 40 percent 
of the population is malnourished.®
The food problem for individuals is properly defined in two 
broad terms. First, hunger or undernutrition results when people 
consume fewer calories and less protein than their bodies need in 
order to lead active lives. Second, malnutrition results from a 
deficiency in essential vitamins and minerals, usually from not eating 
the right kinds of food. For example, 100,000 children go blind each 
year from lack of Vitamin A.^ It is the problem of malnutrition that
^Presidential Commission, World Hunger, p.4
^Ibid., p.2
1961-65 AVERAGE = 100
1961-65
Average 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1971-Averai
Stagnant or Declining 
Output (Africa)
Benin USDA 100 92 94 93 91 99 94
FAO 100 102 104 108 96 106 102
Ethiopia USDA 100 100 103 100 91 87 91
FAO 100 101 101 103 99 90 96
Ghana USDA 100 99 91 88 83 87 87
FAO 100 93 91 101 104 101 104
Guinea USDA 100 93 108 106 107 104 107
FAO 100 97 105 102 94 92 94
Kenya USDA 100 99 100 95 97 95 94
FAO 100 109 107 107 102 96 99
Liberia USDA 100 97 83 83 85 94 89
FAO 100 98 92 93 95 102 96
Madagascar USDA 100 105 108 107 107 103 104
FAO 100 102 102 98 90 93 92
Mali USDA 100 92 82 87 66 67 68
FAO 100 98 91 90 74 72 75
Niger USDA 100 100 98 96 73 71 71
FAO 100 110 103 96 81 70 73
Nigeria USDA 100 94 83 96 96 92 93
FAO 100 88 88 91 85 79 82
Senegal USDA 100 89 82 66 63 91 82
FAO 100 91 87 69 59 75 75
Sierra Leone: USDA 100 95 97 94 97 95 97
FAO 100 111 107 107 109 107 107
Toga USDA 100 112 115 105 98 93 96
FAO 100 115 119 114 84 87 89
Uganda USDA 100 107 109 105 97 85 93
FAO 100 99 101 108 101 94 98
Upper Volta USDA 100 91 86 79 68 78 70
FAO 100 106 106 102 86 60 78
74
Continued (over)
61-65 '66 '68 '70 '72 '74 '71-7/
Increased Outputs 
(Africa)
Ivorv Coast USDA 100 107 107 112 115 128 120
FAO 100 93 105 111 116 121 119
Malawi USDA 100 127 106 109 129 123 123
FAO 100 121 112 109 126 122 122
Rwanda USDA 100 101 116 121 112 99 111
FAO 100 106 107 119 112 96 110
Zaire USDA 100 109 114 122 108 115 111
FAO 100 107 121 118 115 127 118
Widely Divergent Indices 
Burundi USDA 100 107 105 110 107 82 101
FAO 100 105 105 129 171 181 165
Cameroon USDA 100 102 105 95 94 95 95
FAO 100 105 121 122 124 121 122
Tanzania USDA 100 111 100 102 103 86 97
FAO 100 110 107 124 114 109 113
Zambia USDA 100 122 81 92 157 135 129
FAO 100 113 102 99 99 103 100
South Asian Countries 
Bangladesh USDA 100 91 101 95 80 85 85
FAO 100 91 100 92 78 80 82
Burma USDA 100 85 92 92 83 88 88
FAO 100 86 94 94 84 90 90
India USDA 100 89 100 109 98 95 101
FAO 100 91 99 105 97 96 100
Pakistan USDA 100 101 119 132 118 121 120
FAO 100 99 116 120 114 113 114
Sri Lanka USDA 100 89 110 120 100 108 102
FAO 100 96 101 98 93 97 94
Source: Nicholson and Esseks, "Politics of Scarcities' ' p. 682-3
receives little attention as far as targeting of food aid by the 
developed nations.
It Is useful to define the developing nations of the world more 
explicitly In order to understand the nature of the problem. Devel­
oping nations can be classified Into four groups. First, there are 
the traditional food surplus states, e.g. Thailand, Burma, Nepel and 
Kenya. With reasonably high further Investments and good management 
of the food-farming sector they should be able to continue to feed 
themselves. Second, there are the financially self-sufficient states 
e.g., Algeria, Indonesia, Morocco and Saudi Arabia. Though not self- 
reliant In food they have high foreign exchange earning ability from 
oil, phosphates or other raw materials. These earning potentials 
will enable them to continue to purchase sufficient food and the pos­
sibility to Improve their own productive capability. A third group 
of states Is more vulnerable. They cannot afford the Import conse­
quences of stagnant food production but have already made definite 
progress with the "Green Revolution". For example, Pakistan, the 
Philippines or parts of Latin America have unexplolted potential In 
good climates and underutilized land. The fourth group consists of 
severely disadvantaged countries. They face limited foreign earnings 
capacities, population pressures (India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka) and/ 
or unfavorable climates (the drought-prone African states neighboring 
the Sahara) which threaten periodic or near chronic food scarcities.
In these states (basically In South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa), 
high population density relative to food-producing resources keeps
them close to or below the margin of minimum n u t r i t i o n . 10
The developing countries included under the fourth category lie 
in the equatorial zone and to the south. There are some unique 
problems to increasing production of food in these tropical zones. 
First, the effects of tropical intensity of sunlight results in a 
considerable difference in the necessary amount of rainfall for food 
production because of increased evaporation. For example, although 
Manchester, England and Accra, Ghana receive the same amount of rain­
fall Accra only gets about one-third to one-half the amount of rain 
to balance evaporation, whereas Manchester receives about twice the 
amount required to achieve balance.^ Second, rainfall variation is 
such that tropical areas suffer considerable losses of topsoil.
Since rainfall is concentrated in one or two short rainy periods the 
majority of the year is composed of a long dry season. Due to the 
intense heat of the dry season, soil becomes dry and parched. When 
the rains do come they are usually in the form of heavy downpours. 
Since soil can only retain so much moisture at once there is consid­
erable runoff. The action of high temperatures and heavy rainfall 
leads to the rapid loss of organic matter in tropical topsoils.
Third, the lack of seasonal changes often results in over-cultivation 
of tropical areas, since there is no winter period during which the 
soil can gain some nutrients. Current agricultural practices exac­
erbate this problem considerably. Traditional farming practices in
^^Norman K. Nicholson and John D. Esseks, "The Politics of Food 
Scarcities in Developing Countries,"International Organization, 
32 (Summer 1978), 680-1
Walker, "Evaporation", Journal of West African Studies, 2 
(August 1956), 108
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these areas required the plots be left fallow for four or five years 
before they would be farmed again. However, increasing population 
pressures generated a demand for food that requires re-using the abon- 
doned plots sooner than before (only two years and in some cases 
within a year). This increased pressure on the land without some 
form of replenishment of the soil nutrients or Intercropping results 
in greater instance of diminished productivity.
The combination of maldistribution of land, increased populations 
and low governmental support of the rural sector within the nations 
creates an environment that is not conducive to increased p r o d u c t i o n ? 12 
In addition to these, the more technical problems of moisture loss, 
depletion of topsoil, exhaustion of soil nutrients, desertification 
and salination are reducing the amount of arable land and therefore 
reducing the possibility that nations of the fourth category can 
feed themselves in the future.
It is evident that in order for production levels to be increased 
significantly that a structural transformation would have to take 
place both socially and economically. Presently, the amount of growth 
that can take place is hindered by the nature of the developing nations’ 
societies themselves. Traditional societies rely on the expectation 
that individual families or extended families be responsible for their 
own food production. This type of production rarely results In any 
surplus available for the marketplace of frees up any of the labor 
force for other industries. This reduces the possibility of increasing 
the Gross National Product (GNP) per capita since agricultural returns
l^Nicholson and Esseks, Politics of Food Scarcities, p. 698
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remain fairly constant. When one family has a crop failure usually 
their neighbors have the same crop failure. Neither family has the 
ability to purchase food since their primary source of income- 
agriculture-has failed. Additionally, it is difficult to convince 
the small farmers to sell surplus since they are concerned about 
next year's supply.
The development of agriculture, particulary in low income nations, 
is essential, not only for the provision of adequate food supplies, 
but for overall economic growth and national development as well.
The agricultural contribution to development can be summed up in 
five items of consideration:
1. Economic development is characterized by an increase in 
the demand for agricultural products. If food supplies are not in­
creased to keep up with this demand, development will be seriously 
impeded.
2. Increased agricultural exports are an important way to 
increase income and earnings from foreign exchange.
3. The industrial labor force must be drawn from agri­
culture .
4. Agriculture is the main sector in many underdeveloped 
economies, especially those in the fourth category described earlier.
It should make a substantial contribution to the capital needed for 
the expansion of other industry.
5. Rising incomes of farmers can be important stimuli to the 
expansion of the industrial sector. The weight of agriculture in 
the economies of developing countries is so great that even a slight
11
improvement can make significant impact on growth and development
13at both the individual and national levels.
It is necessary to initiate a redistribution of resources in 
order to increase production through land r e f o r m s . A n  extremely 
small traditional farm cannot have marketable surplus in sufficient 
amount to improve the technologies utilized from more primitive to 
those employing more recent horticultural advances except the 
simplest labor-centered technologies. Such a shift in technologies 
is essential to increasing production of food overall. Even more 
important regarding the necessity of land reform, is the needs of 
the large landless class. Undergoing a land reform that provides 
larger segments of land for the purpose of food production as opposed 
to "cash crops" will allow these landless to feed themselves. As it 
is, there are few local mechanisms to feed this large segment of 
poorer societies. The average size of farms in developing nations is 
extremely small. For example, in Kenya the average size farm is 8.3 
hectares (a hectare is about 2.5 acres) and in Pakistan only 3.5 
hectares. In these same countries the top one percentile of farms is 
much larger. Kenya's top one percent have farms of 611.1 hectares 
and Pakistan's 96.9 hectares. In Sri Lanka 80% of the farms are less 
than one hectare.
l^Mary A. Caliendo, Nutrition and the World Food Crisis, (New 
York, MacMillian Publishing, 1979) p. 122
^^Johnston and Kilby, Structural Transformation, p. 79; see also 
Nicholson and Esseks, p. 715
^^Ibid., p. 80
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In economies that depend so largely on their agricultural production 
this disparity proves to be cataclysmic. Expanding the problem of the 
gap is the fact that these large farms owned by such a minority are not 
producing food for the rest of their society but crops such as rubber, 
bananas and the like for export to the developed nations! Thus these 
large tracts of land are removed from the poor nation’s ability to pro­
duce its own food.
The average farm size in the United States is 160 hectares. How­
ever, it would be impracticle, for both political and economic reasons, 
to attempt to bring the developing nations’ average farm size to this 
level. First, there would not be enough land to go around for all the 
agricultural workers. Second, the surplus labor force would place an 
excessive burden on the remainder of the economy. Third, it is not ex­
pected that the agricultural sector would be able to incorporate the 
same kind of technology that is necessary to operate such large farms. 
Finally, due to the limitations of energy and other natural resources 
the expansion of capital-intensive farming is not a desirable objective.
It is desirable for developing nations to increase production 
through labor-intensive methods. If labor-intensive agricultural 
methods are to be practiced, more people must have a larger share of 
the land. Since methods will not be energy-intensive as noted above, 
it is neither practical nor even possible to provide extremely 
large farms to all. However, there is enough arable land available 
from the former colonialists and the large capital-intensive farms 
to provide sufficient land for the landless agricultural labor
13
force without causing irreparable damage to the local economies. In 
fact such a move will result in higher food production and less dep­
endency on the food exporting nations. It would be practical for 
the developing nations to purchase the large farmlands for this pur­
pose and turn the land over to the landless class not retain control.
In the long run it would prove beneficial to the development of the 
overall e c o n o m y . M a n y  of the large farms in the developing nations 
produce cash crops such as coffee and cocoa which do little to contri­
bute to the nutritional welfare of the general populace. Thus, 
breaking up the large farms should do little to harm the overall econ­
omy in the long run. First, many of the developing nations are not 
able to pay for necessary food imports with the profits seen from the 
large farms. Second, the profits are usually not kept within the 
borders of the poor nation since the western farmers seek goods from 
the western world.
It does not seem likely that the developing nations will be able 
to employ the same type of farming methods used by the developed na­
tions. First, there is the fact that developed nations are primarily 
in the temperate zones. As noted above the developing nations are 
mainly in the tropical zones and there are unique problems associated 
with such a climate. Second, there is the problem of the labor force 
itself. In order for the developing nations to employ large scale 
farming there would have to be a dramatic shift in the labor force 
from the rural areas to the urban areas. Since such a shift means an 
equal increase in manufacturing this presents a formidable obstacle.
^^Eckholm, "Small Farms", p. 15
14
There exists today and most likely in the foreseeable future insuf­
ficient investment capital availvable to make such a shift. Further, 
Johnston and Kilby found that:
. . . the size of agriculture relative to the rest of 
the economy imposes a ceiling on the rate at which workers 
can be shifted to nonfarm occupations. This effort rein­
forced by the rapid growth of the population working age 
which compounds the difficulty of altering the occupational 
composition of the labor force of a late-developing country. 
Thus in a predominately agrarian economy, even with very 
rapid growth in the industrial and service sectors, the 
proportionate size of the agricultural labor force will fall 
only slightly; and for many years the absolute size of the 
farm labor force will grow. The structural-demographic 
characteristics obviously have powerful implications for the 
design of an efficient agricultural strategy.
Finally, current farming practices in the developed countries are 
energy-intensive. Given the current price structure and long-term 
availability of energy, especially oil, in the world today, the 
non-oil-producing developing nations are unlikely to be able to 
increase the amount of energy imported or produced domestically to 
improve substantially their agricultural productivity. Overall, the 
probability of developing nations increasing their food production 
through "modern" techniques, as they exist, is unlikely at best.
A possible solution to the dilemma of developing nations 
increasing production is to increase labor-intensive efficiency 
through new technologies. Since the bulk of the efforts of the 
"Green Revolution" have been concentrated on capital, as well as
^^Johnston and Kilby, Structural Transformation, p. xvii
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energy-intensive methods, development of labor intensive methods
is s c a n t . A l t h o u g h  the technologies applied to tropical farming
have been adequate during their long history and have responded well
to conditions of the past, they no longer sufficiently meet the
19needs of the people. Thus, it would be necessary to increase 
research substantially in improving these techniques.
It is clear, therefore, that the changes necessary for sufficient 
increase in food production in the LDCs will take a considerable amount 
of time. The problem is that the need for increase in food is here 
and now. The developing nations will, therefore, need more efficient 
food aid in order to increase their own production. This aid should 
be aimed at ensuring an adequate diet without competing with the 
local production or creating a situation of dependency. If people are 
not fed while the necessary changes are taking place, internal pol­
itical instability (and in many cases, resulting international insta­
bility) may prevent the structural transformation from taking place. 
Further, unless these short term needs are seen to, there will be 
enormous instability in the global food regime. Without an effort to 
improve local production along with temporary concessional aid the 
problem of hunger will become more severe.
In the developed nations of the world, on the other hand, the 
amount of food production has increased dramatically since the
18Donald Q. Innis, "The Future of Traditional Agriculture"
Focus, 30, (Jan-Feb 1980): 1-8
19Johnston and Kilby, Structural Transformation, p. 21
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Second World War. In the United States alone production of crop and 
livestock has risen 40 percent since 1950. Each year since 1950 (ex­
cept 1970, 1974, and 1977) has seen a new record harvest. Further, 
exports of food and feed grain have increased by a remarkable 10 per­
cent annually in the last fifteen years!20
However, continuation of these trends of increase seems unlikely. 
Each year approximately 3 million acres of land are lost to urban 
sprawl. Another 7 million acres of land are lost to erosion and
salination. This requires that farmers turn to less fertile and drier
areas to grow their food. Water is also a problem. There is a net 
depletion of approximately 96.8 million acre feet of water annually
with only a replacement of 81.0 million acre feet by rainfall and
21melting snow during a year of normal precipitation.
Current production levels remain high (the USDA announced on May 
11 a record winter wheat harvest for 1981). In 1980 the United States 
produced 264 million metric tons of cereals. Appendix A compares the 
amounts of production worldwide in the developed nations and the devel­
oping nations between 1978 and 1980.
The United States and other net food exporting nations contri­
bute huge amounts of food to the rest of the world. Because of its
^^Congressionl Budget Office, Public Policy and the Changing 
Structure of American Agriculture, Washington, 95th Congress 
2d session 1978
21lrrigation, Water Use and Management, An Interagency Task Force 
Report, Washington, B.C.,U.S. Government Printing Office (June 
1979)
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agricultural productivity in 1977 the United States fed its own pop­
ulation and still exported 43 percent of its wheat, 42 percent of its 
rice, 44 percent of its soybeans, 34 percent of its grain sorghum and 
26 percent of its corn. Although the U.S. produced only 23 percent of 
all wheat and coarse grains produced in the world, American grain ex­
ports account for about 54 percent of all grain traded in the world.
A Central Intelligence Agency report found that in 1974 the U.S. sup­
plied 75 percent of net global grain exports, Canada accounted for 
15-20 percent and Australia and New Zealand accounted for the 
remainder. Tables 1.3 and 1.4 demonstrate the trends over the years 
in world grain trade. Grains and cereals are used as the primary 
indicators of food trade.
Table 1.3 The changing pattern of world grain trade, 1934-1938 
to 1976* (million metric ton)
Region 1934-38 1948-52 1960 1970 1972-73 1976**
No. American 5 23 39 56 89 94
Latin America 9 1 0 4 -3 -3
Western Europe -24 -22 -25 -30 -18 -17
E. Europe/USSR 5 - 0 0 -26 -27
Africa 1 0 -2 -5 -1 -10
Asia*** 2 — 6 -17 -37 -38 -47
Australia & N.Z. 3 3 6 12 7 8
Note: Positive numbers indicate net exports: negative numbers indie
ate net imports
* Figures derived from Lester Brown, Table 1.2, p.11 and Potential 
Implications of Trends in World Population, Food Production and 
Climate, OPR-401, United States Central Intelligence Agency, Wash­
ington August, 1974, p. 15 
** Preliminary estimates of fiscal year data.
*** Includes Japan and Asian Communist Countries
Source; Hopkins and Puchala, "Perspectives", p. 584
22 Congressional Research Service, U.S. Food Policy, Library of 
Congress, 96th Congress, 1st Session 1979 1979 IB #79-1528
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Table 1.4 Net cereal deficits in less developed regions*
(Million Metric Tons)
Actual aver Actual Projected**
Region 1969-70 1974-75 1990
Asia 8.3 15.1 41.2
N. Africa/M. East 7.9 12.0 29.7
Sub-Sahara Africa 1.5 2.1 23.9
Latin America (1.0)** 4.4 (8.4)
Total 16.7 33.4 86.4
* Figures represent net deficits-i.e. larger gross deficits minus 
the predicted surpluses of potential exporting countries in the region. 
** Projected on the basis of 1960-74 production trend in cereals which 
averaged 2.5% per year, consumption projected on the basis of assumed 
population growth, income growth and income elasticities of demand for 
food grain and feed grain. Income assumptions that produced the projec­
tions in this table reflect "low growth" variants (between 1.5 and 2%/ 
year); if higher economic growth occurred, the projected demand and the 
consequent size of the deficits would be even large (unless growth in 
production increased, growth in already higner than in developed coun­
tries) .
***Parentheses indicate net surplus for region.
Source: Hopkins and Puchala, "Perspectives", p. 585
Laureen Both asserts that the U.S. cannot continue its efforts to 
feed the world. Primarily due to soil erosion and depletion, the U.S. 
cannot increase production at the present rates of growing demands. She 
asserts that efforts should be made to limit large grain purchases, that 
farmers should be provided incentives to set aside land, that production 
should be increased in the developing nations in order to meet the 
growing hunger problem. It would not be in the best interest of the 
United States or the world to continue present policies that increase 
dependence of the world on the U.S. for food, Ms. Soth c o n c l u d e s .^3
Even though the U.S. provides so much food to the world, the
^^Laurecn Soth, "The Grain Export boom: Should It Be Tamed?"
Foreign Affairs, 59 (Spring 1981): 895-912
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manner in which food policy is made is inconsistent and haphazard.
Given the possibility stated above, that the U.S. cannot expect to con­
tinue to provide as much food, this type of decision-making will only 
serve to aggravate the problem of hunger. The drawbacks of the current 
decision-making process were demonstrated by the decision in 1972 to 
sell grain to the Soviet Union. While altering U.S. food policy in the 
interest of foreign policy and farm policy the U.S. failed to deal with 
supply problems. Even though the grain sales drastically adjusted the 
stocks and raised prices, subsidies were continued and production 
ceilings still imposed. The problem lay in the failure of the U.S. to 
gear up production for increased demand. Many millions of acres were 
not f a r m e d . T h e  reason that U.S. food policy is often inconsistent 
is due to the fact that policy-making bodies must deal with four com­
peting concerns in determining what policy will be:
1. farm policy - what government does to influence production 
and marketing
2. domestic economic policy - that which is employed to control 
inflation, recession, etc.
3. global welfare and development policy - that which contrib-
25utes to the general welfare of the Less Developed Countries. Unfor­
tunately, the concern for global welfare is generally considered the 
last priority and has the weakest constituency. This was expanded
Destler, "United States Food Policy 1972-1976: Reconciling 
Domestic and International Objectives", International Organ- 
zation 32 (Summer 1978): 617-653
Z^Ibid., p. 618
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upon by Henry Nau who claimed that elimination of world hunger stood 
little chance of becoming the primary focus in American food policy.
The problem of hunger is not a temporary phenomenon. There are 
no ready-made solutions and the severity of it will probably increase 
in the near future. It will take a considerable amount of time for 
the developing nations to undergo a transformation in order to feed 
themselves. Although the developed nations, especially the United 
States are contributing large amounts of food to the rest of the 
world there remains a widespread presence of malnutrition. Since 
enough food is actually produced to feed everyone at levels necessary 
for good health the immediate malaise is distribution. It is in 
this area that efforts should be concentrated in the manner of crisis 
response until the more elusive solutions to development and food 
production increases are accomplished.
However, distribution cannot be controlled by extra market means 
indefinitely, nor should it be. The ultimate objective of any efforts 
to improve worldwide nutrition levels must be the development of abili- 
ity of nations to feed themselves. While this is possible, it cannot 
be expected to take place overnight. The first step therefore, is a 
short term resolution of food distribution failings while development 
is being tackled. Since distribution of food is the most immediate 
problem and the aspect that can be dealt with from an adminstrative 
perspective, it is upon this problem that this examination shall con­
centrate. In order to arrive at possible solutions it is essential to
Henry R. Nau, "The Diplomacy of World Food: Goals, Capabilities,
Issues and Arenas", International Organization, 32 (Summer 1978): 
803
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examine more closely the process of the distribution of food interna­
tionally.
Distribution of Food
Food is transferred internationally via two chanels, trade and aid. 
Commercial channels travel essentially East and West; concessional chan­
nels run North and South. For example in 1975-76 the developed nations 
including Europe, Japan and the Soviet Union purchased a net 58.7 
metric tons of grain while all of the developing nations, predominantly 
in the south, purchased only 30.6 million metric t o n s . T h e  signif­
icance of this factor is that the developed nations control the food 
market, making it difficult for the nations in the South to improve 
their nutritional lot. This process of international food transfer is 
referred to as the "global food regime" by Hopkins and P u c h a l a . ^8 
According to Hopkins and Puchala, within this global food regime there 
are eight sets of "norms" that create the general distribution environ­
ment :
1. Rèspect for the free market even though protection of the 
producer's markets and prices seems to be practiced by the United States 
and other large producers
2. National absorption of adjustments imposed by international 
markets, especially the United States (i.e. storing and releasing of 
surpluses)
3. Qualified acceptance of extra-market channels of food distri­
bution (foreign aid); however market needs takes precedence over extra-
27Nicholson and Esseks, "Politics of Food Scarcities", p. 709
2&Hopkins and Puchala, "Perspectives," p. 615
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market needs.
4. Avoidance of starvation - famine is extraordinary and should
be met by extraordinary means.
5. Free flow of scientific information - the U.S. has resisted
in the past but has recently been quite cooperative in this effort.
6. Low priority for national self reliance - exporting nations 
wish to remain exporters. (This norm has recently been rejected in 
many parts of the global food regime but remains a significant con­
sideration when analyzing how food policy is determined.)
7. Lack of concern or at least concrete action against chronic 
hunger.
8. Inhospitable to challenges to national sovereignty either in 
the form of international interference in domestic affairs or in the 
form of supranational regulations.^9
These norms have been primarily set by the United States since 
World War II. Since the U.S. has controlled most of the international 
food exports it would follow that it should establish the rules. At 
the heart of the system's inability to respond adequately and equi­
tably to world hunger are the basic principles that underlie the 
norm-setting process of the regime. First, the rules of the regime
originate as national policies, which are internationally bargined and 
30coordinated. Secondly, political forces shaping norms of the food 
regime are largely divorced from the majority of peoples most directly 
affected. The LDCs do not play a role in setting regime norms. Rather
29 Ibid., pp. 615-616 
^^Destler, "U.S. Food Policy", p. 634
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they are the target of the concessional trading system, of funds to
foster development and requests to undertake reforms.31
The shortcomings of such an environment of world food distribution
result in considerable problems for the developing nations. Price 
inflation in foodstuffs and competing demand from industrialized nations 
such as the Soviet Union, Europe and Japan limits LDC access to the 
markets. Industrial countries’ willingness to extend aid, which has 
fluctuated more according to both domestic and international expe­
diencies than to needs, constrains LDC access to the international 
concessional system.
In recent years the weakness of the global food distribution 
process has come to light. During 1972-76 when industrialized nations 
experienced a recession, the amount of food available was reduced from 
a reserve of wheat stocks equivalent to 89 days worldwide consumption to 
only 33 days in 1976.32 Compounding this problem were a series of 
extensive crop failures and the rise of oil prices resulting in the 
developing nations having less capability of providing for themselves. 
Since fertilizers, a petroleum product, were in short supply, overall 
production was reduced during 1972-1976. The result was that prices 
were rising and, at the same time, demand was increasing sharply in the 
Soviet Union and Europe, Consequently, at a time when food aid and 
availability at low prices was most needed by the LDCs they were least 
available.
3^Nicholson and Esseks, "Politics of Food Scarcities", p. 680 
32Hopkins and Puchala, "Perspectives," p. 585
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Price instability in the international food market exacerbates 
hunger in a number of ways. First, windfall profits can be gained by 
the shortages. Therefore the higher prices become essentially a tax on 
consumers by producers, usually grain dealers. The consumers that are 
able to pay the higher prices have the highest priority, depriving the 
poorer nations of the limited supplies. This applies to internal as 
well as international markets. Second, marginal producers facing such 
forces (e.g. sudden rise in supply) can be wiped out since prices of 
the food of the larger producers fall below those of the smaller pro­
ducers and these smaller producers are unable to compete with the lower 
prices. Third, excessive fluctuations undermine planning for farmers 
in the LDCs and policies of the import-dependent s t a t e s . 33
Until 1974 the U.S. had been able to stabilize single-handedly 
prices of farm commodities. This had been accomplished by storage of 
considerable amounts.of surplus food(up to 90 days consumptive reserves 
or 3.5 billion bushels of wheat.) Thus the Americans were able to keep 
prices from dropping dramatically during years of over abundance and 
were able to release supplies during times of shortage. However after 
1974, the U.S. could no longer hold down prices. The impact of the 
energy crisis, the Soviet grain deal and the year's foreign crop short­
ages permanently disrupted the American-controlled s y s t e m . T h e  con­
tinuing uncertainty regarding energy and other natural resources has
^^Ibid., p. 592
34Destler, "U.S. Food Policy," p. 584
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prevented the system from recovering and will probably continue to do so.
Bunt, Koo, and Dudley conducted an econometric study of the U.S.
wheat industry to provide empirical measures to use in a stochastic
sequential decision model to determine the optimum amount of wheat
storage. The empirical results suggest that present storage capacity
which might be identified with wheat is substantially in excess of what
can be justified economically. The marginal value of capacity 2.5
billion bushels is zero, and a net loss is realized at higher levels
even when fixed costs are i g n o r e d . ^5 Thus in addition to the inability
to stabilize prices unilaterally, the U.S. is now unable to store the
necessary amounts of food within its own economic interests to return
to international food stability (about 75 or more days consumptive
reserves/3 billion bushels of wheat).36 This alone implies that the
current system employed for the distribution of food is no longer
viable and must be changed.
Beyond the discontinuance of price instability the amount of food
aid provided to the LDCs has been declining since 1949. In 1949 the
United States provided economic aid amounting to 2.7 percent of the GNP;
37in 1979 only 0.27 percent of the GNP had been devoted to that end.
During the critical period of 1972-74 the reduction of food aid became 
most apparent. Table 1.5 shows the amount of food provided under Public
33oscar R. Bunt, Won W . Koo and Norman J. Dudley, "Optimal
Stochastic Control of U.S. Wheat Stocks and Exports," American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics. 62 (Mau 1980): 28-39
^^Hopkins and Puchala, "Perspectives," p. 584 
37Presidential Commission, World Hunger, p.4
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Law 480, a program by which the U.S. government purchases food and pro­
vides it as a form of foreign assistance to LDCs:
Table 1.5
Period
Jul-Dec 1972 
Jan-Jun 1973 
Jul-Dec 1973 
Jan-Jun 1974 
Jul-Dec 1974
Thousand metric tons 
provided by P.L. 480
3,020
1,966
1,016
786
472
Source: Destler, "U.S. Food Policy", p. 635
These reductions, motivated by reactive and political considerations, 
failed to provide aid when most needed (the period of 1972-74 in 
Africa as noted earlier). The reductions were a result of efforts to 
use food as a diplomatic weapon against the OPEC nations and as an 
enticement for the S o v i e t s . F u r t h e r ,  food aid had primarily been 
directed at nations that were considered security priorities such as 
Cambodia, Vietnam and South Korea rather than nations on the "Most 
Seriously Affected" (MSA) list.39 This demonstrated one of the 
weaknesses of dependence on the U.S. providing food aid to needy 
nations. Table 1.6 shows that American generosity has not been what it 
has been perceived to have been by many Americans who claim that too 
much is granted in foreign aid. The table is intended to make the point 
that Americans' fail to put into proper perspective the needs of the 
rest of the world relative to their own lifestyles. This is another 
drawback to the lack of input by the LDCs to the food policies.
S^Destler, "U.S. Food Policy," p. 646
^^Congressional Record, December 4, 1974, S-20602
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There is a real exigency to bring those that are in need into the
policy-making picture.
Table 1.6 U.S. Developement Assistance Compared to Expenditures 
for Selected Items of Personal Consumption - 1978
($ billion)
Alcoholic Beverage
Tobacco Products
Household Cleaning 
Supplies
Toys and Sport 
Supplies
Foreign Travel and 
Tourist Expenditures 
Abroad
Jewel and 
Watches
Admission to 
Spectator Amusements
Barber Shops 
and Beauty Parlors
Official Development 
Assistance
Brokerage Charaes 
and Investment 
Counseling
A
30.9
17.9
16.4
11.7
11.6
9.3
7.4
5.9
5.7
5.5
Source: Presidential Commission, World Hunger, 18
Support for international food organizations has declined in recent 
years. This has coincided with increased activities of the Third World 
nations in the United Nations, and their membership on appropriate 
committees (especially those related to development). This outcome 
has sparked debate over the New International Economic Order. As the
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food regime of the postwar era has come under increasing criticism, 
stress and deviation, the United States and other industrialized states 
have sought to protect their large stakes in the a r e n a . P a r t  of 
their strategy has been to deflate the international organizations and 
hence dampen "populist” pressures by circumventing forums controlled by 
Third World nations. Alternatively, these states have sought to create
new specialized institutions with built-in veto authority. Some of the
organizations have already existed but have been turned to as a viable 
alternative to the Third World dominated organizations (especially the 
United Nations) such as the General Agreement on Trades and Tarriffs 
(GATT), the European Economic Community(EEC) and the International Wheat 
Congress(IWC). Some of the newer organizations that have been proposed 
are most notably, the Organization of Wheat Exporting Countries(OWEC) 
and the American Agricultural Movement(AAM). In some cases, bilateral 
alternatives to multilateral programs were proposed where one-to-one 
rather than one-against-many bargaining conditions would prevail.
Such sentiments and proposals will only contribute to the continued 
disintegration of the global food regime.
These recent occurences have placed a serious barrier to con­
tinued cooperation of the industrialized nations in concessionary food
d i s t r i b u t i o n . it is necessary therefore to bring the responsibility
40nopkins and Puchala, "Perspectives," p. 612
^^Congressional Research Service, Issue Brief, "American Agri­
culture in Foreign Policy, "IB no. 750014, p. 6
4^Hopkins and Puchala, "Perspectives," p. 613
43caliendo, Nutrition, p, p. 126
29
of world food distribution under some form of agreeable international 
order. The present organizations have failed to serve this function 
adequately. Once any pressure on the markets and concessionary channels 
occured to an extreme that distributional priorities needed to be estab­
lished, there were no devices available to perform this function 
rationally. The fact that competing concerns had been able to cause 
dramatic shifts in relatively short periods of time in distributional 
priorities clearly demonstrates that the vital area of food is operated 
under the controls of chaotic forces. Food has come under such a pre­
carious supply situation that these forces can no longer be responsible 
for ensuring its distribution. Previous efforts have failed to provide 
the adequate supplies that do exist to those who need it. It is, there­
fore, time for a resolve to organize the distribution of food inter­
nationally and take seriously the world needs. This is not a new idea 
but a call to action on an old one. Other proposals have been made to 
meet this urgent need. To have an idea of what is possible and/or 
acceptable, the more significant of these proposals should be described.
The International Food Storage Proposals
Hopkins and Puchala describe some of the complexities of the prob­
lem of hunger but end on a note of reserved optimism:
no single or simple policy; indeed no unilateral one,
can solve the global problem of food. Nonetheless ............
practical steps toward coordinating national and international 
action can significantly alleviate the severity of the world food 
problem.44
44Hopkins and Puchala, "Perspectives," 0. 616
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Recently it has been proposed by the Presidential Commission on 
World Hunger, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations, and the U.S. Senate Agriculture Committee that an inter­
national food storage program be instituted to ensure the availability 
of food when and where it is most needed. The World Food Conference
of 1974 recommened that such a program be initiated free from domestic
controls. The program referred to as the*'International Undertaking 
on World Food Security" would provide assistance on the basis of need 
and not political ideology.
It has been agreed upon that under the U.N. Charter that with­
holding food from any nation that is in need is an illegal coercion.^6
Further, precedents of international law have consistently ruled that 
food deprivation as a form of diplomatic maneuvering is a violation of 
the sovereign rights of s t a t e s . T h i s  precedent has evolved from the 
belief that deprivation of food is a utilization of a natural resource 
to compel another nation to comply with the supplier nation's will. 
Further, international law perceives denial of food as a clear vio­
lation of the individual human right of reasonable sustenance. Thus, 
employing food as a diplomatic weapon is illegal in the international 
sphere. The United States is the one nation that has been prone to the 
use of such tactics although the practice has not been confined to 
the U.S. in recent times. It would be necessary to create an inter-
^^Report of the World Food Conference, (Rome, United Nations 
Documents 1975): ResolutionXVII
Bowett, "Economic Coercion and Reprisal by States" 13 Virginia 
Journal of International L a w , 1 (1972) : 2-3
47p.B. Edgar, "International Law and'A Bushel for a Barrell," 
University of Montana, (Spring 1980): 11
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national arrangement that would prevent such actions in the future by 
having the supplies necessary to circumvent producer nations’ ability 
to do so. This is especially true in the current atmosphere of dwin­
dling resources throughout the world.
Only recently has the United States shown any willingness to co­
operate with these ends. In 1974 Secretary of State Henry Kissinger 
proposed before the United Nations General Assembly that an inter­
national food storage program be instituted. Though constrained by 
the tight supply situation at the time, Kissinger nonetheless began to 
address food issues more aggressively in public forums. One reason 
was that he wanted to dramatize U.S. responsiveness to world concerns 
on food as part of the campaign to compel OPEC to make its commodity 
available at less burdensome price levels. At the World Food Confer­
ence, Kissinger offered 34 million tons of wheat (reduced to 18 million 
tons the following year) as a gesture of U.S. willingness to participate 
in such a storage program.
For foreign policy officials, a system of food reserves might in­
sure against future shocks to bilateral relations like the Soybean 
Embargo of 1973. The Soybean Embargo was enacted when the U.S. per­
ceived a threat to its soybean market due to falling prices and a supply 
glut. The reaction, especially by Japan, was immediate and forceful 
to the point that economic sanctions against the U.S. were threatened.49 
Beyond this, such a storage program would provide a vehicle for easing 
world food emergencies. It might also create a breakthrough for inter- 
48i .m . Destler, "U.S. Food Policy," p. 650 
49ibid., p. 646
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national cooperation in the long abrasive sphere of agricultural trade 
and constructive response to LDC pressure for a New International Eco­
nomic Order.
Evidently, the world food problem has reached a point of no
return. It has now become necessary to approach the problem as a
world community. It remains necessary to encourage the developing 
nations to increase their productivity. However, as noted above, this 
will involve a considerable amount of time and effort. In the mean­
time, the problem of hunger will continue to grow unless a system of 
international cooperation that circumvents political expediencies, at
least in some measure, is initiated. This in no way is meant to sug­
gest that there will be no "politicking" in such an arrangement. How­
ever, the atmosphere of cooperation that could be created will remove 
many of barriers to feeding the world’s undernourished. Distribution 
on an international basis will become at least reasonably more equi­
table since the main objective of such an organization should be to 
provide food aid and not economic aid to potential allies.
Mary Caliendo lays out some proposed reforms to the present inter­
national efforts:
1. Food aid should give clear priority to humanitarian purposes. 
Many objectives of food aid have been military and political, but 
food aid must be considered apart from strategic assistance.
2. Food aid and funds should effectively serve the development
SOphilip H. Trezise, Rebuilding Grain Reserves,(Washington, D.C., 
The Brookings Institute, 1976), pp. 51-52
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goals of the developing nations themselves. Much of food aid is 
offered to recipient governments and then resold on local commercial 
markets to people who have the money to purchase it: those most
needy are bypassed.
3. Food aid should be more effectively channeled through 
multinational responses to world hunger. The multinational agencies 
may not be perfect, but channeling aid through them would allow food 
aid to be distributed on a more objective basis. Aid should be 
increasingly used to help developing nations build and stock their 
own national food reserves.
4. New standards for the determination of food aid should be 
established by international concensus among nations. Standards 
should consider: need; equity of distribution; and tax reforms in
developing nations; and achievement of basic human rights.
These proposed reforms would facilitate some improvement in the 
distribution of food. No organization or plan is going to solve the 
problem of hunger. However, there is clearly a need for reform and 
the above suggestions appear to be movement if the right direction.
Beyond these proposals are some crucial elements that must be 
considered. The most obvious consideration is the problem of 
dependency. If food aid were to become and international "fact of 
life" there is a very strong possibility that many of the poorer 
nations would become dependent on this food. Any reduction in this 
aid would be felt severely by such a nation. It would not, therefore,
51 Caliendo, Nutrition, p. 317
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appear to be in the nations’ best interest to increase its own food 
production. Increases may only be temporary, reflecting an unusually 
favorable weather pattern or political situation. If food aid was 
reduced because of this temporary gain the result would be massive 
hunger. To avoid such a consequence many nations would be compelled 
not to increase agricultural production. Another problem of depen­
dency is the possibility of world surpluses being inadequate to pro­
vide for all the nations in need. Since the poorer nations would 
normally expect to recieve the aid, there would be little incentive to 
increase their production or more importantly, to administer prag­
matically its own supplies. Consequently, the reduction of surpluses 
would be harshly felt in the dependent nation and there would be no­
where to turn since world supplies are administered under one program.
The key to avoiding dependency is a program that is clearly 
temporary. Before the program is begun it must be irrefutably estab­
lished that international distribution of food and the agency respon­
sible for it will only operate for a given number of years. The 
program should include a continuous review in order to determine if 
development is taking place. If it is not, then the necessary action 
should be taken even to the point of an involuntary reduction in aid 
(that is, of course, if dependency is determined to be the cause of 
the lack of growth). Included in the temporary nature of the program 
must be a gradual phase-down. This would imply the need for a seg­
mented breakdown of the program(i.e. five-year plans). In order to 
establish and maintain goals, a timetable is essential. The temporary
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and planned nature of an international distribution effort will 
enhance the coming about of a New International Economic Order 
that does not depend on the drastic shift of resources desired by many 
of its present advocates. Such a gradual transition approach avoids 
the kinds of shocks and instability that would be created by more 
haphazard efforts.
An international food storage concept has been discussed in many
circles including the IWC, GATT and FAQ as well as many other inter- 
52national bodies. The principles have been more or less agreed upon 
but other matters of energy and international security have been 
allowed to overshadow the concerns of world hunger. The FAO has 
repeatedly expressed the need for a new concerted effort to bring 
about a world food program that makes a serious, concrete effort to 
feed the earth's people.^3 Although development is certainly the more 
desirable objective among the poorer nations, supplies of food are 
needed now. There is no possibility that most of the MSA nations 
will be able to increase their own productivity in the immediate 
future. It is therefore necessary to establish a distribution system 
as a buffer against mass hunger and even starvation until such devel­
opment takes place.
The remainder of this study will present a proposal for such a 
program, keeping in mind that the food storage program is not an end 
in itself but a necessary transition until a more permanent solution
^^Trezise, Rebuilding, p. 51
33united Nations World Food Conference, "The World Food Problem: 
Proposals for National and International Action, "UN Doc. E/Conf. 
65/4 (August 1974): 177-81
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can take place. It is believed that the duration of such a program 
should be targeted for twenty years. If the development problem and 
the hunger gap show no signs of improvement in this amount of time 
more drastic action should be looked into such as a direct reallo­
cation of wealth. If the Malthusian nightmare is to be avoided an 
international effort should be embarked upon now. Twenty years 
from now will be to late.
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CHAPTER II
CURRENT ADMINISTRATION OF INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS
The previous chapter discussed the magnitude of the global problem 
of hunger. This discussion noted that the dilemma was the result of 
two shortcomings, distribution and low production in the Less Devel­
oped Countries. It placed emphasis on the more immediate need for 
improved distribution and the need to depoliticize international 
distribution of food. The current international structure does not 
meet the nutritional needs of the world. Although a sufficient 
amount of calories and protein are produced, over one-fourth of the 
world's population has some kind of deficiency. In the more serious 
incidents the deficiency is due to simple unavailability of food. 
Considering these problems. Chapter III will propose a reorganization 
of the international bodies that administer global nutrition schemes.
It is not the intent nor the assertion of this report to imply that 
reorganization alone will resolve the hunger issue. This chapter 
briefly examines current international efforts and cites some of the 
major discrepancies that have contributed to the situation.
In the previous chapter some priorities have been listed that 
must be applied to a new international effort to combat world hunger 
in order for the new approach to meet the need. Briefly, these 
priorities are:
1. A clear priority to humanitarian purposes must 1)G set
2. Food aid should serve the development goals of the 
recipient nations.
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3. Food aid should be channeled through multinational responses
to hunger.
4. New, standards for determination of aid must be established.
5. The distribution program must be temporary.
6. The distribution program must be closely monitored and have
specific incremental goals.
These guidelines will be repeatedly mentioned in this chapter and the 
next while a description of the present situation and of the proposal 
is being made in order to demonstrate how these needs can be met.
In order to discuss present discrepancies it is necessary to 
describe briefly the current structure of the international organ­
izations involved in food distribution and observing nutrition
problems. The most notable aspect of world hunger programs is that 
there are a great many agencies involved in international efforts.
The primary organizations involved in this area are the World Food 
Program(WFP), the Food and Agriculture Organization(FAO), the World 
Health Organization(WHO) and the United Nations International Child­
ren's Emergency Fund(UNICEF).  ̂ In addition to these, there are 
several agencies that include nutrition enhancement or agricultural 
development among their responsibilities. These include the United 
Nations Economic and Social Council(ECOSOC), the International Fund 
for Agricultural Development(IFAD), the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development(OECD) and the United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development(UNCTAD) among others. There are also agen­
cies under the auspices of regional international bodies such as the
Ijames E. Austin, "Institutional Dimensions of the Malnutrition 
Problem," International Organization, 32(Summer 1978):816-818
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European Economic Community (EEC), the Organization of American States 
(GAS), and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) that oversee nutri­
tion schemes. Beyond these public bodies there are private organi­
zations that deal with nutrition problems such as the Catholic Relief 
Foundation, the Campaign for American Relief Everywhere (CARE), and the 
International Red Cross. All of these institutions are international 
bodies that direct their efforts at world nutrition. One must also 
consider the national programs that are directed at alleviating world 
hunger, especially the program under Public Law 480 in the United 
States.
Most of the public international agencies were formed in 1945 and
1946 when the United Nations was getting off the ground. The World
Food Program began in 1966 as a temporary body- grew to permanent status
in 1965. The majority of the organizations have grown in size and
complexity since their founding. For example, the WHO began with a
staff of around 220 people in 1945 and in 1976 had a staff of over 
22,600. The complexity of their individual responsibilities have 
increased immensely due to the large number of UN resolutions, the 
World Food Conferences and World Food Congresses. This had been 
especially the case during the Sixties when so many newly indepen­
dent nations joined the General Assembly. Since the vast majority 
of these new members happened to be Less Developed Countries, there
evolved a sizeable increase in pressure to balance the distribution 
2U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Government Operations,
U.S. Participation in International Organization, 95th Cong.,
1st sess., February 1977
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'iof wealth.
In 1974, the United States led the call with other nations for a 
Fourth World Food Conference. Previous World Food Conferences had 
brought together world leaders to discuss the world problem of hunger. 
The resolutions of these conferences usually entailed broad statements 
of intent with little action except calls for future discussion.^ In 
1945 the U.S. was primarily providing aid through the Marshall Plan 
and other similar programs and after 1954 was furnishing food through 
P.L.480. At the time of these earlier conferences(1946, 1955, and 
1965), the U.S. substantially handled food concessions unilaterally.^
No outstanding need for any bold internatioal action existed since it 
was perceived by the conferees that all efforts should be concentrated 
on development in the Third World Nations. Distribution remained 
primarily a responsibility of the United States.^ However, in 1974 
this became no longer the case. As previously discussed, the period 
1972-1976 brought about dramatic reductions in the world food supply 
and scarce surpluses failed to be distributed to the poorer nations.
The Report of the 1974 World Food Conference called for new mea-
3Walter A. Friedlander, International Social Welfare,(Englewood 
Cliffs, N.J., Prentiss Hall, Inc., 1975), p.31
^U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, World 
Food Resolution, 93rd Congress, 2nd sess., July 11,1974
^Austin, "Institutional Dimensions", p. 820
Gibid., p. 819
^David P. Harmon, Jr., "Return to World Grain Surpluses: Trends
and Implications", Critical Food Issues of the Eighties,(New 
York, Pergamon Press, 1979), p. 324
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sures to combat world hunger. As noted earlier, a program for inter­
national storage stood out among the suggestions. These proposals by 
the conference are now considered a watershed in international nutrition
o
schemes. Several proponents suggested that internationl bodies,
specifically the FAO, oversee distribution of food for the world.
Unfortunately, the enthusiasm of 1974 considerably faded shortly
thereafter. In 1977 and 1978, producers experienced record crops and
g
the surplus returned to amounts at pre-1972 levels. This recovery from
the crisis of the mid-1970's built a sense of optimism in world leaders
to the point that interest in new international schemes diminished.
However, the FAO, WHO and UNICEF have reported that the problem that
caused the crisis still exist and the world remains on the verge of
10 'future world food crises. The breakdown of the U.S.-controlled system 
of the 1950's and 1960's remains as a present circumstance. As indi­
cated earlier, one of the norms of the global food regime has been a 
lack of concern for malnutrition. Thus even though malnutrition con­
tinued to escalate, the urgency applied to the world food problem in 
1974 a b a t e d . T o  date the International Undertaking on World Food 
Storage Proposals, so popular in the 1970's remain in the discussion 
phase.
It may be safely stated that there remains a need for a new inter-
. ^Austin, "Institutional Dimensions", p. 815 
g
Congressional Research Service, "U.S. Food Power", p. 12 
^^Caliendo, Nutrtition, p. 3 
^^Austin, "Institutional Dimensions", p. 819
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national effort. However, the current structure of the international 
nutrition enhancement efforts leaves a lot to be desired. This is 
particulary true in light of the type of efforts that must be em­
barked upon in the area of ensuring equitable distribution of food. To 
understand more clearly the weaknesses of the current system it is 
necessary to examine the international agencies more closely.
The principle functions performed by the international agencies 
involved in nutrition are: collection and dissemination of infor­
mation, provision of goods and services, financing and coordination.
1. Collection and dissemination of information. This infor­
mation is divided into two distinct categories, applied research and 
and nutrient supply statistics. The agencies provide this material to 
the U.N. General Assembly, national governments and private insti­
tutions and corporations involved in nutrition.
2. Provision of goods and services. Various agencies, espe­
cially FAO and UNICEF, administer global food programs that are 
financed by the U.N. and its member states. They also provide for the 
distribution of fertilizers and seeds to the poorer nations. Although 
most development assistance is provided through bilateral arrangements, 
the international agencies provide some technical assistance in 
agricultural development in food-deficit nations. In 1978, the FAO 
provided nearly 18 million dollars of direct development assistance out 
of a budget of over 167 million dollars.
3. Financing. Grants and loans are provided by the World Bank 
and other international financing institutions. These financial assis­
tance programs are ordinarily for specific national development plans
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within the developing nations that must be approved by the lending 
i n s t i t u t i o n . The FAO and WHO, among other food agencies, provide some 
limited financing for development plans. In addition, these world nu­
trition agencies arrange for private loans to developing countries in 
their efforts to increase agricultural productivity. (It is worth 
noting that the World Bank lent only 4% of its funds for agricultural
1 odevelopment in 1976.)
4. Coordination. International agencies make efforts to ensure 
that certain bilateral and multilateral programs meet their goals and 
overlap as little as possible. For the most part, this function is 
performed in an advisory capacity since actual coordination would vio­
late norms of national sovereignty. Table 2.1 shows how these functions 
are divided among the nutrition agencies. It can clearly be seen that 
FAQ, WHO, and UNICEF have the largest stakes in the arena.
The functions of the international agencies also include making 
arrangements for conferences and study groups, acknowledgment of 
accomplishments in the food arena and representing the U.N. at regional 
conferences.
It would seem that all of the above activities would do much to 
improve the efficiency of the global food distribution and nutritional 
quality. However, a U.S. Senate Committee reported in 1977 that inter­
national organizations were not effectively meeting their objectives.
12ibid., p. 833 
13lbid., p. 834
l^senate Committee on Government Operations, "U.S. Participation" 
p. 4
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Table 2.1
INTERNATIONAL NUTRITION SYSTEM: INSTITUTIONAL ROLES
Nutrition
Institution
Collection & 
dissemination 
of information
Provision of 
goods & 
services Financing Coordination
INCAP X
CFNI X
ININ X
PAG X X
Food for
peace X
WFP X
Vol. Agen. X
CWFS X
IFS X
CFAPP X X
WFC X X
Universities X
WHO X X X X
UNICEF X X X X .
FAO X X X X
Ag. Res. Ctrs X
CGIAR X
USDA X
IFPRI X
UNDRO X
Red Cross X
IFDC X X
IWC X
AID, SIDA
etc. X X
CGFPI X X
UNDP X
World Bank X X
IDE X
ACE X
lADF X
Source: Austin, "Institutional Dimensions"
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There are several drawbacks to the current nutrition structure that may 
be considered responsible for the shortcomings of international agen­
cies. These drawbacks may be divided into two categories - organ­
izational and political.
Organizational. The general organization problems may be grouped 
into five categories - poor coordination, vague delineation of respon­
sibilities, inadequate review and evaluation, staff limitations and 
International - national relationships:
1. Poor Coordination. The considerable number of agencies in­
volved in the area of nutrition presents many instances of overlap and 
conflict on one extreme to complete neglect on the other. A United 
Nations official put it this way:
I am myself very much concerned with the present situation 
of inter-agency coordination which, to say the least is in my 
opinion very unsatisfactory, and the programmes and the countries 
we are trying to serve are the ones who s u f f e r . 15
The very nature of the agencies themselves produces an environment which 
lacks the coordination necessary to attack the world problem of hunger 
in an organized manner. For example, the FAO is responsible for the 
development of agricultural productivity and distribution of food, the 
WHO is charged with improving nutritional levels in poorer countries 
as this is related to healtli, and UNICEF is responsible for improving 
the general condition of the world’s children including their nutri­
tional well-being. It is apparent that these objectives overlap one 
another. There is presently no on-going device or directive for over­
l^Ibid., p. 822
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seeing the entire effort so that resources can be distributed properly.
2. Vague delineation of responsibilities. Conflict over areas of 
interest prevents any coordination of international activities. This 
conflict arises out of the vague legislative mandate from the U.N. 
General Assembly and other authority-granting bodies. Thus, not only 
do the agencies fail to coordinate their efforts, but their areas of 
responsibility overlap sufficiently to cause actual conflict. It is a 
problem that emanates from the inability of the founding bodies to 
follow through their mandates with sufficient authority. In other 
words, no one is in charge. For example, after the World Food Confer­
ence, FAO proceeded in isolation to propose follow-up activities, only 
advising other bodies such as the WHO and ECOSOC. The plan submitted 
by FAO was rejected by the General Assembly because of the resentment 
generated among the other agencies. The FAO plan was eventually 
replaced by a document incorpating all institutions’ viewpoints. 
Consequently, in spite of the renewed efforts to coordinate inter­
national efforts after the WFC, numerous conflicts continued to exist
because there remains no clear line of responsibilities. A member
of the staff of the FAO in Rome noted:
Institutional friction and poor coordination will inevi­
tably continue unless responsibilities and authority are more 
clearly delineated, operating activities integrated, and a 
superior arbitrator mechanism created to reconcile turf disputes.
3. Inadequate review and évalutation. Because of the vagueness 
of nutrition programming responsibilities and because these are often
^^Ibid., p. 824
l^Ibid., p. 825
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secondary activities for many of the implementing organizations, 
nutrition operations are particulary at risk of becoming no agency's 
responsibility. Consequently, nutrition is especially in need of an 
effectively functioning review and evaluation system. Such review pro­
cedures should be conducted by a group which does not have a vested 
interest in the individual organizations such as the committee of the 
UN that created it, and can therefore, take a more objective view. 
Futhermore, they should cut across implementing organizations rather 
than be just within each entity, as is now the case.^® The most 
immediate advantage that arises from a separate review and evaluation 
body is that the members are not apt to be tied to the same organization 
they are evaluating. This allows the review body to be able to "step 
back" and examine the organization more objectively. It also allows 
the body to compare the agency with similar agencies which cannot happen 
with an "in-house" evaluation structure as readily. The current 
structure is more conducive to promotion of the status quo than to 
improvement of the process.
4. People limitations. The staffs of the nutrition agencies are 
divided between technical/professional officers and the administrative 
officers. The technical experts are fairly removed from the policy­
making process since they are primarily involved in the field 
activities of advising and applied research. The adminstrators, on 
the other hand, are in the seats of power since they are concentrated
1 8 Senate Committee on Government Operations, pp. 27-28
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in the central offices. Further, the emphasis of the agencies has 
remained fairly close to the orginial mandates of the General Assembly 
or other founding body. This has resulted in a resistance to new ap­
proaches or theories. An effort to expand the professional staff's 
nutrition vision is needed. They presently concentrate too much em­
phasis on "grow more" and too little on distribution and social 
20change. The crisis in the mid-70s demonstrated the need for a change 
in philosophy and for less attention devoted to the approaches of the 
1950s and 1960s. Lack of input by technical people in the field in 
the policy-making process has inhibited the ability of the agencies to 
respond to new situations when they happen. Cooperation by both areas 
of knowledge are necessary to retain an on-going dynamic of change and 
response.
The highly politicized nature of the institutions results in 
personnel selection based on political rather than technical merits.
Such an approach to selection lends itself to selection of unqualified 
personnel. This has created a staff that produces mediocre results. 
National governments that have knowledgeable people on their staffs 
involved in nutrition enhancement assign little credibility to the 
suggestions of these a g e n c i e s . Therefore, the depoliticization of
^^Austin, "Institutional Dimensions", p. 826 and Friedlander, 
International Social Welfare, p. 63
^^A. Loveday, Reflections on International Administration,(Oxford, 
London, Clarendon Press, 1956), p. 9
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personnel selection is a prerequisite to creating institutional credi­
bility as a true development force. Strict professional hiring stand-
22ards and a staff development program seem in order.
5. International-national relationships. The nutritional agen­
cies are too closely tied with the diplomatic sector of the United 
Nations. Since the U.N. and other multinational bodies are aimed 
at promoting peace, it is necessary for them to honor the political 
requests of national governments . For example, between April and 
November 1973 an estimated 100,000 people starved to death because 
offering aid that is not requested violated national sovereignty 
traditions. The Haile Selassie government had requested that the
nutrition agencies remain silent about the famine and the request was
2 3complied with by the FAO. Since the U.N. finds it essential to stay 
out of internal affairs because of its general philosophy of main- 
tainin order at all costs, its nutrition agencies are obliged to do 
l i k e w i s e . T h i s  close affiliation with the military-governmental 
concerns of the U.N. hampers the nutrition agencies' ability to perform 
their mission. The overall mission of the U.N. must not be allowed to 
interfere with the specific task of food distribution. Removal of 
this conflict is the first step of "de-politicizing" food.
Political. The political problems that encumber the international 
nutrition areas may be grouped into three areas: policy vacuum,
^^Austin, "Institutional Dimensions", p. 826 
^^Nau, "Diplomacy of World Food" p. 821 
24ibid., p. 827
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knowledge gaps and priority conflicts.
1. Policy Vacuum - Political action requires the statement of an 
overall strategy, including the specification of priorities. Such sys­
tematic planning has been absent in both the national and international
25regime. For example a Senate study of FAO - U.S. Relations concluded 
that :
A coherent, rational and explicit policy consisting of goals, 
objectives, and priorities for the FAO does not exist. What does 
exist are fragments of policies . . .U.S. policy tends to be 
"situation or issue-specificV These policies tend to be negative 
and reactive rather than positive and creative.
For the most part nutrition programs have been on an ad hoc basis
rather than being an integral part of an overall development program.
2. Knowledge gaps - Although development has been a concern for 
some time and the world’s hunger has attracted some attention, the field 
of nutrition, especially nutrition intervention, is a young science.
It is absolutely essential that more research be done and more under­
stood about nutrition before any ambitious programs in the food regime 
be undertaken. Any ambitious international nutrition program is going 
to have the responsibility of establishing priorities and targeting 
specific food requirements. Little is known about nutrition inter­
vention and how best to combat deficiencies. This being the case, the 
methodology for setting priorities would rely too heavily on guesswork
^^U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Nutrition and Human 
Needs, The United States, FAO and World Food Politics; U.S 
Relations with an International Food Organization. 94th Cong.,
2nd sess., June 1976
27Caliendo, Nutrition, p. 5
51
and intuitive targeting. Some of the lack of knowledge is due to the 
policy gaps that have failed to generate calls for appropriate research. 
The more that is learned about nutrition intervention and the sooner it 
is learned, the more effective an international program will be.
3. Priority conflicts. - Nutrition has not traditionally ranked
28high on the political agenda. The main reason for this is that the 
constituency that is most affected has a weak voice in the distribution 
of development funds. Before any steps can be taken, it is crucial that 
nutrition be sold on the international scene as being of the utmost 
importance. The WFC did much to initiate awareness of the scope of the 
problem and, even more important, the amount of commitment necessary to 
make significant progress in international nutrition enhancement. How­
ever, follow-up actions are needed now before the momentum is lost.
Although group-specific programs such as UNICEF are admirable ideas 
in the realm of nutrition enhancement, they are not enough. Unless the 
problem as a whole can be attacked, hunger will continue to require inter­
national emergency relief efforts and no progress toward healthy econ­
omics will be realized. Further, by breaking the needy into groups, 
especially by separating children from others, the damage done to the 
family unit and the individual may far outweigh any benefits that are 
gained by the aid. Damage done to the family unit is caused by forcing 
parents to make a choice between keeping the family operating as one or 
allowing their children to receive nutrition outside the home and sur-
28Austin, "Institutional Dimensions", p. 833
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vive. In most cases, the children will be sent to accept the outside 
assistance. This places them under the influence of cultures and value 
structures outside the family. Since it is the outside people that 
provide sustenance their influence will be the strongest. Although 
the new values may be perceived to be better by some, the family unit 
has been broken down, depriving the children of a very important need - 
familial love. In order for the entire society to be cared for at 
once, an organization that oversees the entire effort must be created.
Other predominant politico-economic concerns will be discussed in 
Chapter 111. For now, let it suffice to say that such concerns and how 
they are treated will have a significant impact on any nutritional 
program.
In addition to general organization problems and political con­
cerns, there exist management problems within the staffs themselves 
that must figure into any new scheme for improving the global food 
regime involving international agencies. Many of these problems are 
unique to international public administration and deserve some atten­
tion :
1. The authority structure - International civil servants must
29contend constantly with multiple sources of authority. Generally, 
the international assemblies have the final oversight responsibilities 
of the agency. However, these bodies only provide vague mandates—  
usually with "no teeth in them." Consequently, it becomes difficult 
to implement programs for nutrition enhancement in a specific nation
Loveday, Reflections, Ch. 2
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without going through other authority structures, including the recip­
ient nation’s government, the UN oversight committee, the WFP and 
others all over again. This problem of course, applies to all interna­
tional bodies. The reason that it becomes so significant in the nutri­
tion arena is because "time is lives."
Another authority problem is internal. Even though the agencies 
have a Director contained within the Secretarist, there is no final 
authority. Within the Secretariat itself there is a considerable amount 
of political conflict likely to go into each decision, depriving them
of consistency. Even though there is rarely nationalist conflict with­
in the agencies themselves (except in cases of international crisis
or strictly political appointments by member states), it is difficult
to avoid friction related to the various regional p e r s p e c t i v e s . ^0 For 
example, although staff members from an industrialized nation may see 
the need for heavier stress on internal reform of a developing nation, 
a member from a developing nation may believe emphasis should be placed 
on transfer of wealth from North to South. These kinds of conflicts 
take place on a continuing basis and result in not only ambiguous but 
often countermanding decisions.
2. Personnel morale - The most outstanding aspect of inter­
national civil service is that, at least for the professional staff, 
it usually involves relocation to another country. Not only is this 
person placed into a new culture, but the people that he/she works with
30 Ibid., p. 27 and Scheman, "Management", p. 17
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are from other cultures. This situation creates an intense feeling 
of isolation which may detract from the quality of output. If the 
staff member has children, the morale problem is even further compli­
cated. The parent must make a decision whether to have his/her child 
educated in the new culture or sent abroad to his/her native land.^l 
The longer the international service lasts, the greater is the risk 
that the employee can become a person without a country in that the 
person can no longer readily identify with either his place of assign­
ment or his native country, politically, culturally or socially. Na­
tional or home loyalty is an important need and cannot be taken lightly. 
Herzberg would probably classify this as an hygenic motivator that
should not be neglected. Maslow would consider this need as one of af-
32filiation, the third category in his hierarchy of needs. It is 
necessary to provide some device for maintaining contact with o n e ’s 
own culture while at the same time creating an international perspec­
tive.
Salary does not at the present time seem to create as much of a 
problem. Currently, international civil servants (i.e. professionals; 
clerks, etc. are usually hired locally and placed on a different pay 
scale) are paid under what is commonly referred to as the Noblemaire
Plan.33 
o 1A. Loveday, Reflections, pp.2-7
(Jcrnid M. Coldhabcr, Organizational Communica Lion,(second e d .) 
(Dubuque, Iowa, Wm. C . Brown Co., 1979), p. 7 5
Henri Reymond, "The Salary Problem in the United Nations 
Service", International Review of Administrative Sciences,
XLIV, no. 2(1978): 243-258
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Under the plan individuals are paid on the basis of the highest scale 
of the member states' civil service. In addition to this, employees are 
paid allowances for relocation and repatriation. Thus, current inter­
national civil servants are receiving around 115 percent of the U.S.
34Civil Service pay. Although this pay system has been examined and 
alternatives sought by several international bodies, no committee has 
ever r e c o m m e n d e d  substantial changes. The plan has been used by the ICS 
since 1921.
3. Management practices - In spite of the fact that international 
agencies may be perceived to be modern institutions that should incor­
porate new ideas, they lag considerably behind in their management ap­
proach. Most of the agencies operate under a strictly heirarchical 
approach below the level of the Secretariat. It would be difficult to 
conduct things in such a manner at the Secretariat level, since there 
are political considerations of the various nationals that preclude 
any one person from being in charge. However, in the rank and file,
the classical bureaucratic approach is still considered the optimum 
35technique. There is little opportunity for upward communication.
This is especially tragic in the international scene, since the number 
of perspectives involved would have to be considerable and diversity 
immense. In order to promote new ideas and accomplish the organizational 
goals, it is more appropriate to have a more participatory management 
approach. It is ironic that rule from an often chaotic Secretariat
34U.S. Senate Committee, International Organizations, pp. 52-55
3 5 Scheman, "Management", p. 21
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would be so absolute. Rather than have the regional perspectives de­
bated at the top they would be better negotiated if allowed to "bubble 
up" from the staff due to the extremely diverse needs of the various 
regions.
The current international nutrition programs evolved from genuine 
concern for the world's hungry. However, shifts in political perspec­
tives within the agencies developed into an array of programs that 
sought to resolve different aspects of the problem. The result has 
been the creation of several bureaucracies that overlap and in some 
cases conflict with one another. The dramatic episode of the mid- 
1970 s demonstrated the need for a new approach. The problem was that 
the structure of international programs cannot handle the new approach 
that is needed. The international effort could no longer be a collec­
tion of programs that responded to the food situation. It became 
apparent to the membership of the 1974 WFC that international nutri­
tion enhancement efforts would have to take the lead. The structure of 
the current agencies is inadequate for the task, simply because they 
arose from specific sets of circumstances and no general long-range 
planning has been involved. It is clear, therefore, that a new ap­
proach to the international administration of nutrition enhancement 
that involves replacing all the old agencies with a new one - the 
International Nutrition Agency (INA).
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CHAPTER III 
INTERNATIONAL NUTRITION AGENCY PROPOSAL 
It has been argued in the preceding chapter that there are a num­
ber of major shortcomings in the current structure of the international 
nutrition effort. These shortcomings are more than just an inconven­
ience; they are debilitating to any serious efforts to resolve the 
problem of hunger. If the international food storage program was 
instituted under the present system, it would take years of negotiation 
just to decide which agency would have what responsibilities. Although 
there is no ready cure for this global dilemma, efforts must be made 
to improve the devices that are utilized to combat hunger. It is in 
this interest that the following reforms are presented. Chart 3.1 
provides an organizational chart of the proposed International Nutri­
tion Agency. The paragraphs below discuss some of the aspects of the 
organization and how they meet the requirements as previously stated.
CHART 3.1 ORGANIZATIONAL CHART FOR THE INA
WFC
= c
TCC --- oversight committee (OC)
FAO R e p . WHO Rep.
REGIONAL OFFICES 
(HO)X
DIRECTOR
UNICEF Rep. AGRIBUSINESS 
R e p .
PRIVATE ORG, 
R e p .
1. Separation of the nutrition agencies from the United Nations -
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In order to separate food from politics, it is necessary to separate the 
nutrition arena from the political arena. As long as food programs are 
affiliated with a political assembly, it is probable that food will be 
used to promote world peace. In the process of pursuing that mission, 
it becomes necessary to balance the interests of one state or group of 
states with those of another. These practices are counterproductive to 
the goal of feeding the world. There can be no strings attached to 
ensuring minimum nitrition. If feeding the world is truly an agreeable 
objective to everyone then there is no room for other ideologies. It 
may be perceived by the Western nations that providing food aid to a 
Third World nation that is communist or merely leaning to the left of 
center would be promoting the cause of communism. In fact, this percep­
tion lay behind U.S. removal of aid from Mozambique. Such political 
manipulation of food policy is contradictory to a goal of nutrition 
enhancement.
In addition to removing food from the East-West conflict, sep­
arating nutrition from the U.N. will permit the INA more flexibility 
than the current agencies have. First, it will circumvent the inter- 
national-national conflict discussed earlier. A body that only has 
the responsibility of providing food will not be placed under the same 
kind of diplomatic pressure as food agencies have been in the past.
If the agency proceeds to identify a food shortage in a politically 
sensitive area it will not as readily be considered a political weapon 
and hence the INA will not be so reluctant to declare it. Of course, 
this kind of credibility will take time to construct. The U.N. saw 
it in its best interest not to permit the publication of the famine
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in Ethiopia in 1973 because it violated national sovereignty, an act 
contradictory to Sections 1, 5, 24, and 25 of its own Charter. An 
independent food agency, on the other hand, could have identified such 
a problem and realistically have claimed no ideological or strategic 
intent and thus no intrusion on sovereignty. Although there is no 
truly politically neutral agency, the specificity of the issue, espe­
cially that of nutrition, would reduce the possibility that its actions 
were based more on political aims than on purely professional ones.
Included in this proposal is the consolidation of all nutrition 
institutions of the UN under one body. This merger would also include 
bilateral agencies, multilateral agencies and nongovernmental agencies 
as members of the governing bodies. The private agencies would remain 
independent but will now be able to participate in the planning process 
which will improve their effectiveness. Such an organization would be 
able to resolve the problems effectively.
The problems of coordination and delineation evolve from the prac­
tice of divisions of labor by broad topic (Health under WHO) or cross­
cutting categories (UNICEF - children are everywhere). The fact that 
all concerns of food distribution are placed under one agency prevents 
an inherent problem of coordination since the devices are created to 
organize the effort. Since the agengy will be founded under one char­
ter, means are provided ultimately to decide who has what responsibil­
ity.
The assembly of member states to head this "super agency" would 
be the quadrennially-convened World Food Conference (WFC). The day-to- 
day operations will be headed by a Technical Coordinating Committee(TCC).
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The directorship of the TCC will be rotated biennially among the members 
of the TCC and no member-state may have consecutive terms to prevent 
suspicion of too much control by one member. The director will be elec­
ted by the members of the TCC itself. The selection of leadership will 
be discussed in more detail later in this chapter.
2. Decentralization - The organization will be divided into re­
gional offices. These regional offices will have primary authority 
over the setting of objectives and the distribution of resources within 
the region. There will be seven regions: European, North Asian, South
Asian, African, Pacific, North American, and Latin/South American (see 
figure 3.2). The food contributed and the funds donated will be divided 
proportionately among the regional offices. The WFC will set the general 
guidelines as to how much each region should receive. This will be 
geared solely to need with consideration for potential shift of that 
need and interference to development. The Technical Coodinating Commit­
tee together with representatives of each region will determine the 
actual annual budgets. Thus the real control of specific distribution 
will rest with the regional offices and not the headquarters, somewhat 
resembling a "block grant" approach to food distribution. Such a 
decentralized approach will facilitate coordination as opposed to an 
attempt at control from the top since the administration will be broken 
down into more manageable units with the unique aspects of each region.
It is extremely difficult to establish global priorities that take into 
account local needs. Dividing the nutrition field into regions reduces 
the goal-setting to a more manageable undertaking. The control mechan­
isms can be seen in the next section describing review and evaluation.
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It is through these devices that the regional offices remain integrated 
with the whole agency.
3. Review and evaluation - An Oversight Committee (OC) that con­
ducts all review and evaluation of the program should be established. 
This committee will consist of one member from each region that repre­
sents the FAO, WHO, and UNICEF departments along with one member from 
private business (or agriculture ministries in the case of nationalized 
farming sectors) and a nongovernmental nutrition agency (CARE, etc.), 36 
members in all including a chairman. It will be their task to review 
each activity and operation every four years and report to the WFC.
The tasks of the members of the OC will be divided into the eight 
department groups and the Director's office. The chairman and three 
members will review the progress of the director and each department 
area will be evaluated by four members each of the remainder of the OC.
By dividing the responsibilities among the members of the OC the indi­
vidual areas will receive sufficient attention. Additionally, the mem­
bers themselves will acquire the necessary skills and expertise to pro­
vide a substantial amount of guidance and to maintain consistent sta- 
dards. Four years will allow a sufficient amount of time for the OC to 
examine all of the activities, yet an unannounced schedule will keep the 
individual activities from becoming too lax in between inspections.
This will provide for evaluation across the board as well as keeping the 
WFC informed of its agencies' activities. If there are programs that are 
not meeting the goals of the organization they may be revised or discon­
tinued as appropriate. Special investigations may be requested at any 
time.
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4. Management - First, the staffs of the Technical Coordinating 
Committee and the Regional Offices will be orgainzed in a matrix. On 
one axis shall be the administrative staff including the budget con­
trollers, human resources, transportation and legal. On the other axis 
shall be the professional people including nutrition analysis, research 
and development, storage and agricultural forecasting and technology. 
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 are provided as organization charts for the staffs 
of the Technical Coordinating Committee and the Regional Offices.
A matrix is necessary because it offers the potential of achieving 
flexibility that is so often missing in conventional single-1ine-of-com­
mand organizations. It also offers the potential of reconciling this 
flexibility with the coordination and economics of scale that are the 
historic strengths of large organizations.^^ The directors in each 
organization are not in the matrix but are of it. They do not yield 
any of their authority to the other department heads. It is the di­
rectors that oversee and sustain the balance of power. This function 
requires a blend of autocratic and participative leadership styles.
At the same time that the director has the final unchallengable author­
ity, the matrix managers (department heads) must work together, provide 
all the relevant information, and come to agreements on distribution of 
resources. In order to accomplish this type of atmosphere the director 
must perform the functions of power balancing, managing the decision 
eentent and setting standards. It is through this type of management
^^Paul R. Lawrence, Harvey F. Kolodney, and Stanley M. Davis, "The 
Human Side of the Matrix" Matrix Organizations, Davis, Lawrence, 
Kolodney and Beer, (Reading Mass, Addison - Wesley, 1977)
CHART 3.3
MATRIX ORGANIZATION CHART
FOR THE INTERNATIONAL NUTRITION AGENCY 
TECHNICAL COORDINATION COMMITTEE
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CHART 3.4
MATRIX ORGANIZATION CHART
FOR THE INTERNATIONAL NUTRITION AGENCY 
REGIONAL OFFICES
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that flexibility is achieved.
Briefly, the essential characteristics of matrix organizations are 
as follows:
1. The identifying feature of a matrix organization is that some 
managers report to two bosses rather than to the traditional single boss. 
There is a dual rather than a single chain of command.(see Charts 3.3 
and 3.4)
2. Firms tend to adopt matrix forms when it is absolutely essential 
that they be highly responsive to two sectors, such as needs and tech­
nology; when they face uncertainties that generate very high information 
processing requirements; and when they must deal with strong constraints 
on financial and/or human resources. The matrix form can help provide 
flexibility and balanced decision making but at the price of complexity.
3. Matrix organization is more than matrix structure. It must al­
so be reinforced by matrix systems such as dual control and evaluation 
systems, by matrix leadership behavior that operates comfortably with 
lateral decision making, and by a matrix culture that fosters open 
conflict management and a balance of power.
4. Most matrix organizations assign dual command responsibilities 
to functional departments (marketing, production, engineering, and so 
on) and to product/market departments. The former are oriented to spe­
cialized resources while the latter focus on outputs. The arrows on two 
matrix charts on the preceding pages indicate the flow of products (food 
distribution). Thus the right side is equated to marketing.
5. Every matrix organiztion contains three unique and critical 
roles: the top manager who heads up and balances the dual chains of
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command; the matrix bosses/department heads (functional, product, or 
area) who share subordinates; and the 2-boss managers who report to two 
different matrix bosses. Each of these roles has its own unique re­
quirements .
6. The matrix organization started in aeorospace companies, but 
now firms in many industries (chemical, banking, insurance, package goods, 
electronics, computer, and so on) and in different fields (hospitals, 
government agencies, professional organizations) are turning to differ­
ent forms of the matrix structure.^7
The actual conduct of the organization is certainly not confined to 
the relationships shown on the chart. However, primary responsibilities 
and relationships are reflected. By utilizing a matrix structure, the 
administrative-technical dichotomy is integrated so any decision must be
considered for its merits under both perspectives. Such a structure will
38also require communication between the two concerns. It is important 
that all interested parties have input.
There are some very real drawbacks to the matrix system of organ­
ization. The most significant problem is the complexity of the struc­
ture. The matrix must be continually "sold" to the department heads.
At the same time the work relationships require that the matrix managers 
and the two-boss managers exercise positive communication skills. This 
means that a constant training program must be carried out along with 
an atmosphere conducive to open communication. Such an atmosphere is
37lbid., p. 118 
^®Ibid., p. 124
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difficult to maintain in normal business organizations. The fact that 
the INA is a multi-cultural, multi-ideological organization would com­
plicate the relational environment even more.
However, this additonal compexity is one of the reasons that a 
matrix is suggested for the INA, even though it may seem contradictory. 
In a new organization that must be thrust together and become goal- 
oriented, open communication is essential. The matrix system requires 
a dynamic informational exchange and stresses the need to constantly 
reinforce this aspect of organizational management. In a way, it is a 
backdoor approach to open communication. The need for international 
individuals to communicate has been overworked in the past few decades. 
In the INA the reason for the necessity of open communication would 
revolve around the management structure and the international aspect 
would be downplayed. Such a device would promote an ongoing response 
to new information and approaches and avoid mediocrity derived from 
diplomatic compromise.
Another problem in the matrix structure is in the difficulty of 
dealing with two bosses. To be able to deal with the potential stress 
and anxiety of such a situation requires an individual who can avoid the 
power plays and facilitate decisions between the two bosses. Once 
again, this requires an ongoing training environment so that two-boss 
managers can develop these skills. The need for such an approach will 
serve the INA well. In an indirect manner, the intricate inner workings 
of the agency will be involved In improving informational flow. In gen­
eral, although the matrix structure seems to present some new problems 
for an international agency, the long term results will be an improvement
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in an area basic to international dealings - communication. The struc­
ture itself forces members to recognize perceptional differences and to 
use them for the good of the organization.
In a normal hierarchical structure, it is common for one department 
to have more power than the others. An increase in power by a depart­
ment involves greater access to resources, financial and human, over 
other departments. The reason a department achieves predominance varies. 
Sometimes it is attributed to the philosophy of the director which will 
assign a higher priority to a certain department's needs. Frequently, 
the assention of a department is a consequence of the personalities 
within the orgainization. Certain individuals just naturally come to the 
forefront because they have the persuasive abilities that place them 
there. Often the relationships between the head of a department and the 
agency director provide the momentum that favors that department over 
others. This type of power structure is a difficult problem to deal with 
in any bureaucracy, but has even more serious implications within an in­
ternational agency. When one department or person rises to predominance 
in the international agency, it may be perceived to be a form of favor­
itism toward a particular nationality or region. Such international 
jealousies may influence the amount of cooperation that member states 
may be willing to provide. For example, if the African members felt 
that the European members of the staff were acquiring too much power 
within the agency it could be taken as another imperialistic front to 
enhance the African nations' cooperation. This would undermine the 
objectives of the organization.
In a matrix type structure, much jealousy would have to be avoided.
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Since members of the staff would essentially be working for two or more 
departments it would be difficult for any one department to achieve 
predominance. Further, it is critical for an organization to maintain 
open communication throughout the structure in a matrix setup. If this 
is not done, the cooperation among the staff itself will rapidly disin­
tegrate. If the department heads are not working together in the oper­
ation of the agency, the professional members will be receiving counter­
manding orders and power overlaps impossible to deal with. The results 
would attract widespread attention throughout the INA and require rapid 
action to correct. It will be one of the primary responsibilities of 
the Oversight Committee to make sure that the matrix continues to func­
tion. IVhereas in a hierarchical structure imbalance in the power struc­
ture can continue undetected for quite some time, the same is not true 
in a matrix. A matrix compels the departments to cooperate. As stated 
above, this kind of intense departmental cooperation is even more criti­
cal in the international arena than in any other, due to the sensitive 
nature of international-national relationships.
Second, in addition to matrix organization at the executive level, 
must be an increased incidence of participatory management. Since nu­
trition is a relatively new field it will require a considerable amount 
of input to comprehend its complexities more fully. Participatory 
management will do much to accomodate the political necessities of an 
international body dealing with this area. In such a dynamic process 
of exchanging ideas in a sometimes confusing field, devices must be 
incorporated to facilitate the optimum amount of contribution by the 
members. The problems of hunger and nutrition invite the inputs of
7 1
many perceptions - from the market concerns of industrialized nations to 
the concerns of political stability in recipient nations. These percep­
tions and concerns cannot be contributed solely or primarily from the 
department heads alone. In a field that fluctuates as much as nutrition, 
all of those members that deal with it must be allowed to contribute. A 
great deal needs to be learned in a short amount of time and the more 
people that contribute to that learning, the better for all concerned.
Since all nationalities should feel that they are to influence the 
outcome of the process, they will be less likely to devote too much of 
their efforts toward serving their own national interests if they are 
an active part of the organization. Further, considering the unique 
problems of morale in an international agency as previously described, 
it will enable the participants to become more a part of the agency and 
to act as a group. Although the agency cannot replace the social-cul­
tural need entirely, it is expected that participation will decrease 
some of the phenomenon of isolation and promote a feeling of comara- 
derie among the staff members.
One of the recurring phenomena in an international agency, accord­
ing to Loveday and Scheman, is a sense of isolation by staff members.
This is due to the fact that members find it extremely difficult to 
identify as members of any one culture, once thrust into an environment 
of many cultures, usually in a location that is different from their 
native land. Participatory management allows the members of the organ­
ization to become a closer-knit group. Specifically, it is recommended 
that a management-by-objectives (MBO) technique be pursued. It is most 
desireable that the need for a sense of belonging be directed at achiev­
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ing the organizational goals. The commonality created by integrating 
individual and organizational goals will develop a sense of belonging 
that will substitute for many of the needs of cultural identification.
5. Selection of leadership - Perhaps the most sensitive area in 
international agencies is the selection of leadership. It is important 
to provide a device that will ensure an equitable distribution of power 
among the member states. Even though the original intent of the organ- 
is to depoliticize food as much as possible, it is acknowledged that 
initially political sensitivities will have to be met. First, all per­
sonnel selection, but especially the leadership selection, must revolve 
around meeting the objective of the organization. Therefore the heads 
of the Regional Offices (ROs) and the Technical Coordinating Committee 
(TCC) must come from the nutrition fields. This includes nutritionists, 
agriculture specialists, members of private relief agencies and social 
scientists that have studied the problem, among others.
Second, there must be a rotating system of members incorporated 
into the selection process. This rotation will consider geographical, 
ideological and economic diversity. Geographically, selection will 
require that at least one member will come from each region. This will 
prevent most incidents of criticism of the agency being "pro-North", 
"pro-South", "pro-West", "pro-East" and so forth. Ideologically, 
efforts must be made to ensure that members come from a variety of 
ideological persuasions (socialist, capitalist, Marxist, etc). Econom­
ically, efforts must be made to select members from different economic 
systems (social-capitalist, capitalist, etc.) Since ideological and 
economic viewpoints often coincide, there will be little difficulty
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accomodating these concerns. However, it should be noted that although 
members may come from a nation categorized under an ideology, their 
economic perspectives may vary (e.g. a person from China and a person 
from the United States, although from nations that are different ideo­
logically, may have similar economic perspectives). In consideration of 
the above concerns the following selection process is proposed.
As stated above, the chairman of the TCC will be selected from the 
TCC every two years. The TCC members will be elected by the WFC every 
four years. Each region must be represented on the TCC. The Director 
of each Region will be selected every six years by the representatives 
to the WFC from each nation of the region and a selection committee 
composed of three members each from the international nutrition agency, 
the private business sector (or head of agriculture ministry, as appro­
priate) and private nutrition agencies. All Regional Directors must be 
approved by the WFC by a simple majority. This is necessary to ensure 
that the agency does not splinter. All major actions must be approved 
by the WFC. Although decentralization is desirable, complete separation 
is not. Such a disintegration would only return the global food dis­
tribution process to its current disarray, possibly even worse, since 
there would be no one party attempting to coordinate the effort such as 
the U.S. and the U.N. presently attempt. The Regional Directors will 
serve six-year terms in order to promote continuity. Selections made 
during the years that the WFC does not convene will be approved by the 
TCC or by a special session of the WFC if called by a two-thirds major­
ity.
Oversight Committee members will be selected by the WFC every eight
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years. After the initial appointment of the first 36 members, selecting 
half every four years. The length of the appointment is designed to 
develop a considerable amount of expertise in the OC. The members of 
the Oversight committee need not be from the nutrition field. In fact, 
it will prove beneficial to choose experts in the individual department 
fields. Such selections will add an element of objectively to the 
evaluation process.
Budget
Any discussion of a new organization must include a description of 
how it must be funded. Laying out the actual budget provides some in­
sight into the feasibility of the organization. Budgets are ordinarily 
approximations of future needs based on past trends. This budget pro­
posal is no exception. Although no organization such as the INA pre­
sently exists, some assertions may be drawn from the present organiza­
tions. The total budget of the major nutrition agencies - FAO, the 
WHO, UNICEF, the World Food Program and miscellaneous international 
organizations involving food programs in 1977 was $795 million (in 1977 
U.S. dollars). The largest of these budgets involving food distribution 
effort falls under the WFP with a total budget of $347 million. Trans­
ferring the entire process of food distribution over to the INA would 
involve an annual budget of approximately $551 million. The increase 
over the WFP is due to the need to draw in some of the other agencies’ 
staffs in the consolidation.
Table 3.5 shows the requirements for staffing of the INA based on 
1981 international civil service pay scales. The entire staffing budget
Table 3.5
75
HUMAN KI'SOURCi: AND lUIDCI' i Ki:gi’lKI'.Mf;NTS Of' Till■: 1NA
Depart. Position (number needed)
Ihiyscale equivalent 
under the Current ISC
Per annum 
pay rate ($) Total
TCC Chair (1)
Comm i t t cc meml)crs (6)
Staff Director (1) 
Department Heads (8) 
Professionals (16) 
Assistants (16) 
Technician/Specialist (58)
Asst. Sec. Gen 
D i rector
Principle Off leer 
Senior Officer 
First Officer 
Second Officer 
Associate Officer
68,900
53,300
46.000
41.000
34.100
27.100 
22,200
68,900
319,800
46,000
328,000
545.600
433.600
287.600
Sub Total 3,029,500
OC Chair (1)
Committee members (35) 
Investigators (72)
Asst. Sec. Gen 
Director 
Senior Officer
68,900
53,300
41,000
68,900
1,865,500
2,952,000
Sub Total 5,507,400
RO Director (7)
Deputy Director (7) 
Department Heads (56)* 
Professionals (896)* 
Assistants (896)
Director
Principle Officer 
First Officer 
Second Officer (+H) 
Second Officer
53,300
46.000
38.000 
30,400
27.000
373,100
322,000
2,128,000
27,238,400
24,281,600
Sub Total 123,962,300
Total Human Resources Budget** 132,300,000
*These positions must be placed at a slighty higher paygrade 
due to the extent of the responsibilities. However, it is 
inadvisable to place them at the same pay level of their 
counterparts on the TCC staff.
**Based on 1981 salaries
Other Budget Requirements***
Food Purchases 
Storage Facilities 
Buildings 
Supplies 
Support Staff 
Retirement Fund
191 m 
91.2m 
52 m 
24. Am 
24. Im 
36. 2m
Total $418.9m TOTAL BUDGET - $551,200,000
***Based on proportion of current professional staff requirements 
to overall budgets of existing international agencies.
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requirements of the aforementioned agencies reflected 24 percent of 
their total budget. Applying this ratio to the manpower requirements 
of the INA would bring the total budget requirement to $551 million 
dollars. The entire budget of the WFP can be easily transferred to the 
INA since the new agency would be assuming all the responsibilities of 
the WFP. This would leave a net requirement $204 million to be trans­
ferred from the other agencies or 54 percent of the remaining budgets. 
The Directory of International Organizations claims that approximately 
one-third of the budgets of these organizations is used for transfer of 
food directly or indirectly. The funds for the initial years could 
therefore be provided by a direct transfer of funds from present pro­
grams. In addition to these funds members would have to provide another 
$54 million. The fact that additional funds need to be provided is not 
entirely negative. The separate funds will reinforce the independence 
of the INA and represent the member states' commitment to the agency.
The funds would be derived in the ensuing years through direct contri­
butions much on the same scale as have been provided through the U.N.
It is this aspect of the INA that should be attractive to member 
states. In the U.N. organization member nations contribute financial 
support to the overall organization. The U.N. process then divides the 
money up among its many activities. Some members, tlierefore, will have 
their funds transferred to activities that they have been opposed to in 
the past. Money contributed to the INA will be for one purpose - the 
transfer of food to those who need it. There are few people that will 
oppose such an objective (except those who seriously support the 
"Triage" approach to world hunger). Even those that may have reason
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not to agree would find it against their interests to deny support.
The best way to prove that an international food distribution system 
cannot work is to go along with the majority and give it a try. If the 
effort fails, then the rest of the world will be more willing to listen 
to a "minority" viewpoint.
The second aspect which will make the INA an attractive investment 
will be its temporary nature. The INA will only have to be funded for 
twenty years. In order to make the program successful it will be neces­
sary to wean the world from the system. Thus after only ten years the 
INA will be allowed no increases in funding. In fact, beginning with 
the twelfth year at the latest, the funding schedule must begin a steady 
reduction in 12^ percent increments for the remaining eight years. This 
budget arrangement must be agreed upon in the beginning and adhered to 
throughout the planned period in order to be sucessful. This is an 
extremely critical requirement that will ensure that the INA will remain 
a temporary organization. The budget reduction statute in the initial 
agreement will prevent the INA from becoming entrenched and increase the 
Incentive to bring about success in the limited amount of time. Member 
nations can therefore be reasonably assured that they will not be send­
ing "good money after bad." They will not be caught up in funding an 
organization that survives only because it is a self-generating bureau­
cracy. The funding will have a firmly stated ceiling that members can 
see as a limit on how much the project is worth. Later a distribution 
plan that allows for flexibility within the agency will be discussed.
This allows for the dramatic shifts in need. Organizations that are 
created from very admirable intentions are the ones most likely to
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continue past their utility. For example the League of Nations con­
tinued to exist and be funded after its failure to take action against 
the Japanese in 1933. It was at that point funding should have been 
discontinued. However, the concept that founded the League was a high 
ideal and there was no device for suspension of funds when the organ­
ization had outlived its ability to serve its goals. The INA, on the 
other hand will have such a device and can be seen as a wise investment 
by member states.
Staffing the INA
The final area of consideration regarding the organization of 
the INA, before going on to a description of its function, will be that 
of human resources. This section will not so much lay out the numbers 
(since Table 3.5 essentially does this) but a description of personnel 
policies in a fairly unique organization. The most difficult human re­
source problem in this case is the temporary nature of the INA. It will 
be difficult to recruit highly qualified professional people for a 
temporary agency. With all the previously described problems that exist 
for those in the International Civil Service (ICS) they have one very 
strong motivator for accepting and keeping the work - job security. On 
the surface, it would appear that a temporary agency would remove that 
positive aspect of the service.
However, the temporary concept need not be considered a negative 
aspect for tlie personne] at a]]. It is suggested tliat the INA incor­
porate a retirement system similar to the one used by the United States 
military with some modifications. The plan will be established as 
follows :
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1. Members will be eligible for retirement after the full twenty 
years in an amount equivalent to 60% of their highest rate of pay.
2. Members forced to leave due to budget reductions will be el­
igible for retirement equal to 3 percent for each year of service based 
on their latest rate of pay. Members that leave voluntarily are eligi­
ble only after 12 years and will receive their pensions after the age 
of 70.
3. Retirement funds will come from monies set aside by the agency 
and invested rather than coming from a continued use of public funds 
after the organization has been discontinued.
Most modern organizational theorists recognize that financial se­
curity is only part of a formula for motivation of employees.  ̂ In order 
to facilitate the accomplishment of the INA's goals, it is desireable 
that the individuals' goals be integrated with those of the agency. It
would, therefore, be most appropriate to incorporate a management-by-
2objectives (MBO) approach to staff development.
Most individuals are "goal-striving mechanisms" who will perform 
more effectively if they are more involved with establishing the targets 
of their occupations.^ The INA must develop specific goals/objectives 
since it is a temporary program. These objectives cannot be in the form
^Goldhabler, Organizational Communication, pp. 73-77
^George S. Odiorne, Management by Objectives, (New York, Pitman,
1975) p. 54
^Maxwell Maltz, Psycho-Cybernetics, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,
Prentiss Hall, 1960) p. 7
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of general ideals at the individual level but specific statements using 
measurable outcomes.4 Specific goals provide the staff with the tools 
for measuring their success on an on-going basis. Without clear specif­
icity the members will be able to interpret their progress to fit their 
actual accomplishments and not vice versa. Such a practice will leave 
the organization open to acceptance of mediocrity. Without goals the 
agency will be allowed to drift in a haphazard fashion. Since the 
agency is new and pursuing a large objective, "drifting" will prove 
counterproductive. The new agency will require a constant dynamic that 
focuses on the overall objective as well as the intermediate goals in 
order to make sufficient progress toward alleviating world hunger. The 
objective is a large task that needs to be broken down into manageable 
stages with clear, measurable targets. When goals are not realized the 
staff will be able to evaluate to correct without being overcome by the 
immensity of the overall objective. The fact that the agency will be 
comprised of a totally new staff means the MBO practices will enable 
them to become more quickly oriented. Further, the process of setting 
goals will encourage the staff to examine their purpose of being. The 
best method for developing the specificity desired is to build the or­
ganization’s goals upon those of the individuals. It would not there­
fore, be desirable for the WFC or the TCC to set out specific goals 
without getting essential feedback form the individuals’ goals not only 
for the sake of the individuals but for the sake of the effectiveness 
of the organization.
‘̂ Odiorne, Management, p. 84ff
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Utilizing the MBO approach contributes to the solution of two major 
problems. First, using the goal-oriented approach will enable the agen­
cy to keep the temporary nature in mind and work towards it. Second, it 
will present an acceptable form of proactive management without yielding 
the amount of control the WFC and the TCC will need to make an inter­
national effort work. The style of management is designed to keep ef­
forts focused on the objectives of the organization and not just a man­
ner of placating the employees. It is this type of dedication to goals 
that will be necessary not only to keep the agency temporary but to make 
an impact on the global food problem.
The Function of the INA
The general organization of the INA, its budget and staffing re­
quirements, and some of its personnel and management needs are an 
essential part of the proposal. Having laid out that groundwork, it is 
now necessary to elucidate the actual function of the INA in some detail. 
Table 3.6 is a decision flow chart showing where the decisions will be 
made concerning the distribution of food. Note that at each stage there 
are influences outside the INA affecting those decisions. The first 
external influence is the most important one - the direct purchases of 
food by nations. The amount of food that is purchased by the industrial 
nations is going to determine how much food will be available for the 
INA. It has been noted in Chapter 1 that in times of shortage, as in 
the case of 1974-75, the amount of food that is made available for poor 
nations is severly depleted by the purchases of the industrial nations. 
The INA would be able to do little to prevent this from recurring since 
prevention would require an imposition on national sovereignty to a
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degree not currently considered acceptable by most nations. However, 
the INA will be involved in this process. It will be one of the func­
tions of the INA, especially the TCC, to monitor the direct purchases 
and available supply in order to participate in the sales negotiation 
process. By being aware of the overall numbers of supply and demand 
the INA will be able to inform nations concerned how much the sales 
will affect the poorer nations. The INA will have the advantage of 
understanding the world picture and have considerable leverage over 
member states. No longer will the poor nations go unrepresented in 
trade negotiations. Participating nations will be able to make a 
conscious effort to prevent the LDCs from having to settle for "table 
scraps". The supply situation is going to become more severe in the 
next twenty years until production is increased in the food-deficit 
nations. The INA will serve as a powerful negotiation ally to keep the 
poor nations alive during this period of tight supply.
The next function of the INA that is subject to considerable out­
side influence but somewhat more under its control is the transfer of 
food from producing nations to the INA. It will be necessary for the 
INA to negotiate vigorously to obtain the highest amount possible 
through concessional channels. It will be in the interest of the sur­
plus nations to contribute this food, not only for political stability 
but also since they would be contributing members to the budget of the 
INA. The more food that must be purchased by the INA the less effective 
the organization will be and the international effort will become more 
expensive.
It is very doubtful that the concessions will provide all the food
Table 3.6 83
FOOD DISTRIBUTION UNDER THE INA
SURPLUS
FOODS
DIRECT PURCHASES 
BY NATIONSCONCESSIONAL MARKETED
PRICES SET 
BY THE TCC
INTERNATIONAL
NUTRITION
AGENCY
SPECIFIC
AMOUNTS
SET BY THE TCC
GENERAL DIST. 
GUIDELINES SET 
BY THE WFC
_> REGIONAL OFFICES
RECIPIENT NATIONS
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that the INA will need. Therefore it will be necessary to purchase 
some of the surplus foods. Thsi possibility has been provided for in 
the budget. Such purchases of food are not only necessary to meet the 
needs of the INA but also serve to stablize the market. In this pro­
cess the TCC will negotiate the prices of the purchased food. Again 
this will require vigorous negotiating by the TCC to keep the prices as 
low as possible. In this area the quadrennial meetings of the WFC will 
play a crucial role. It is during these conferences that most of the 
hard negotiations should occur. The WFC msut strive to reach firm 
commitments from the producing states not only for concessional levels 
but for the price ranges for the direct purchases. At the same time 
the recipient nations will be expected to maintain reasonable limits on 
the amount of food requested. A unique aspect of the INA is clearly 
presented here. The organization will be negotiating within itself for 
the transfer of food. The primary decisions on movement of food rests 
within the INA, not bilateral negotiation of the INA versus the indi­
vidual nations. Thus demands will be seen as a worldwide demand and 
not the quarreling of nations over the limited supply. It is in this 
manner that the agency will be able to provide a more sustainable 
balance in the food markets.
Once the surplus foods are attained by concession and purchased it 
will be distributed to the Regional Offices. The amounts each RO will 
receive will be determined by a two-step process. First, the WFC will 
set general percentage guidelines during its session. For example, 
the following table demonstrates a possible set of guidelines:
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Tgble 3.7 Percentage ranges allowed to each Region
Region % Range
I (Europe) 0-5
II (North Asia) 10-20
III (South Asia) 15-30
IV (Africa) 20-40
V (Pacific) 5-15
VI (North America) 0-5
VII (Latin/So. Amer.) 15-30
The TCC will then set the specific amounts to be shipped to each region 
based on these guidelines. The guideline range approach allows the TCC 
enough discretion to shift priorities and yet does not remove the gen­
eral negotiating process from the WFC where it should be. The ranges
may be broader or more narrow depending on the perceived need by the
WFC to control the distribution process. Once set during the regular
session of the WFC the ranges must be complied with until the next
session or in the case of extraordinary circumstances, a special ses­
sion may be called. However, there should be little need for such a 
drastic move. Once a RO has received its allotment it may elect to 
lend or concede some of its supply to another Region in the event of 
an emergency.
The final step of the food distribution process is the transfer of 
food from the RO to the recipient nations. Depending on the capability 
of the nation involved, this may be an immediate full transfer of the 
entire allotted amount into local storage facilities or a gradual 
transfer of food from the ROs facilities. It is preferable that the 
food storage be decentralized and as close to the need as possible. 
However, such a system is not always practicable. Many of the poor 
nations do not have either adequate numbers or safety in their storage
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capabilities. Although the INA will encourage improvement of national 
storage systems it will not actively improve the facilities. This will 
not be done for two reasons. First, active improvement will involve the 
INA in development schemes which remain outside its perview. Second, 
such action will not prove to be cost-effective with the limited funds 
available to the INA. The objective of the INA is to distribute food 
until nations can develop their own means of production and/or stor­
age not to participate in that development.
The functions of the INA are directed at the objective of distri­
buting food in a more organized manner than the present global food 
regime. It will not, however, be involved in the distribution process 
once received by the deficit nations. It will on the other hand, 
provide technical assistance in that area upon request. This will 
take the form of advisory assistance and not actual involvement in the 
internal affairs of any nation. Although much of the problem of world 
hunger involves internal distribution the INA can do little to allevi­
ate that need. Any international organization that intrudes or has the 
capacity to do so is doomed to failure before it starts. The nations 
of the world are not prepared to relinquish their national sovereignty 
even in the interest of feeding the world's hungry.
The INA is proposed as an alternative to current international 
efforts to combat hunger. The proposal is based on relative]y simple 
assumptions. First, that the international efforts must be brought 
under one agency. Second, that the nations must develop themselves 
and cannot be developed from outside. Third, in the next twenty years 
direct input of food to developing nations is necessary to keep them
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going until they can increase their own means of production. Finally, 
such an organization must be temporary to prevent dependency from 
interfering with development. There are obviously some specific 
aspects of the INA that have not been set out. This is intentional. 
There is a sufficient amount of detail to intitiate a true dialogue 
among nations to begin the process of establishing the International 
Nutrition Agency. In the next chapter some of the concerns that will 
be raised in such a dialogue are discussed.
CHAPTER IV
THE INTERNATIONAL NUTRITION AGENCY:
OBJECTIVES, IMPACTS AND PROSPECTS
In Chapter I the global food dilemma has been described in some 
detail. It has been found that the poorer nations will need to in­
crease their own agricultural output. However, the process involved 
in achieving such an increase will take a considerable amount of time. 
A round figure of twenty years is chosen as a reasonable period. This 
is due more to the political/social changes that must take place than 
to any technological limits. In the meantime it will be necessary to 
ensure some amount of food security in the LDCs and, therefore a need 
to focus on distribution in the short term. The Chapter closed with a 
description of proposals to create an international food storage 
program.
Chapter II examined the current structure of the international 
nutrition agencies, noting that these programs are not particularly 
effective due to organizational as well as political shortcomings.
A proposal for an International Nutrition Agency has been offered in 
Chapter III as a device for easing the food dilemma as well as for 
improving the international distribution network. It is necessary 
to explain what goals must be sought in order to improve the situation. 
It is also necessary to anticipate possible world reactions to the 
proposal. The need for the INA to concentrate on its objective of 
improving distribution has been implied in the description of the 
proposal. A more extended discussion of which objectives the INA must 
seek is essential at this point.
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Objectives
It is worth stressing that the new organization is not intended to 
be a panacea. However, the structure has the capability of improving 
the global food situation. Intuition grants that an organization can 
only be as good as those persons that participate in it and its results 
only as good as the willingness of its clientele to accept it.
The objective of the new International Nutrition Agnecy should be 
relatively narrow. It must meet the immediate need of ensuring food 
security in food deficit nations. This will entail improving the 
equity of global food distribution as well as overseeing an interna­
tional food storage program. To meet this need will involve efforts in 
research and development and working closely with member states toward 
understanding present needs.
Ensuring food security, at least initially, will require the 
strongest commitment by the member states. The net exporters, espe­
cially the United States, must be willing to provide ample food sup­
plies to the agency. It must be agreed upon that any stocks that they 
either will not or cannot make available through concessionary channels 
will provided to the INA at the lowest possible prices. The net im­
porters must agree to transfer all concessionary imports to the needy 
and that no concessional food will be placed on the open market. All 
of these aggreements will take place at the World Food Conference level. 
They will merely take the form of resolutions. Although resolutions 
have no force under international law, they can be useful. However, 
the intention of such resolutions is to promote an atmosphere that will 
improve the effectiveness of policies toward distribution in the global
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food regime. Some forms of coercion may take place during the negoti­
ating process of price-setting and distribution criteria but these im­
pacts are limited. Overall, the INA can expect to be very effective in 
the area of global food distribution. It will provide the coordinating 
device absent in the global food regime. Generally food-producing 
nations will not knowingly deprive the needy of food. To do so would 
diminish their world image and make other political-economic relations 
difficult to maintain. Since the INA will openly identify needy nations 
and present them to the world community, no nation could claim ignorance 
of the situation, it would be in the interest of these nations to coop­
erate as much as possible. Bearing this in mind, the INA will prove to 
be a successful negotiation device in acquiring the necessary resources 
for distribution. No nation will risk turning world opinion against it­
self if it wishes to continue successful international relations.
The INA must strive to minimize the occurence of providing food 
that unfairly competes with the local markets.^ Any food that, combined 
with domestic production, exceeds immediate need should be placed in the 
international storage facilities. Need will be determined by the per 
capita nutrition standards established by the WFC compared with the 
amount of food available to those who cannot purchase food. Many times 
the elite groups in a poor nation can consume enough food to offset per
^Don C. Paarlberg, "Coping With Abundance", Critical Food Issues 
of the Eighties, Chou and Harmon, ed., (New York, Pergamon Press, 
1979): 372-9
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capita need. It is therefore necessary to include the "ability to pur­
chase" factor. By not placing surplus in a single storage facility, the 
INA prevents any unnecessary sudden release of large surpluses that would 
stifle the small farmers efforts to gain access to the markets. This is 
mainly due to the tremendous logistical difficulty and cost of transport­
ing large amounts of food from many locations. Efforts should always be 
directed at avoiding conflict with local economy self sufficiency, es­
pecially in food production.
The international storage facilities should be decentralized not 
only among the Regions but within the Regions. This will cut back on 
the amount of time needed to transport food to a crisis area. Often in 
the event of a famine or food crisis people starve or die from nutrition-
related ailments simply because it takes too long for the food to get
2there in sufficient quantity. Further, these storage facilities will 
encourage the construction of improved transportation facilities around
3them, something that is currently lacking in many nations. The technol­
ogy involved in constructing and maintaining adequate food storage fa­
cilities must be passed on to local governments and communities so that 
their storage capacity will be improved.
Most importantly, the storage/distributive functions of the INA 
should always be targeted to be temporary. This cannot be stressed
2Lawrence Witt, "Food Aid, Commercial Exports and the Balance of 
payments," Food Policy, Brown and Shue, ed., (New York, The Free 
Press, 1977): 86-7
3Lester R. Brown, By Bread Alone, (New York, Praeger Pub., 1974:
222-3
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enough and must be made clear to all involved. If the organization is 
accomplishing its objective, then ideally, its demise will be the out­
come. Providing aid in such a direct fashion has its drawbacks. If 
food, as with other economic aid, is provided as an ends in itself then 
the recipient nations become overly dependent. Aid must be carefully 
administered so as not to remove the incentive for communities to tend 
their own needs.^ Lappe, Collins and Kinley suggest that food aid, ex­
cept in cases of emergency, are inherently an obstacle to development.^ 
This need not be the case. If aid is provided solely where it is needed 
(meaning where it is not available through other means), then it is ser­
ving a purpose of keeping a society alive so that it may develop its own
resources, human and natural. Hungry people, especially the severely 
hungry, are not able to put forth the kind of effort that is required to 
produce well enough to get back on their feet.^
It is on the question of dependency that the design of the INA
hinges. It is agreeable to most, with the possible exception of some 
large food merchants, that all nations should have the capability of 
feeding themselves. In the economic sense, food demand is inelastic and 
therefore, in spite of current U.S. sales, not a product that is conduc­
ive to large profits in the long term. In order for economies to grow,
^F.M. Moore Lappe, J. Collins, and D. Kinley, Aid as Obstacle,
(San Francisco, Ca., Institute for Food and Development Policy, 
1980): 94-97 
5i’Ibid., pp.139-146
baliendo, Nutritioi 
U.S. Senate, World Food Resolution, pp.34-5
balie . n, p. 12; Brown, By Bread Alone, p. 224; and
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manufactured goods and services are essential. Food is basically a raw 
material and if people become richer, demand for food only increases 
slightly beyond subsistence levels. The processing and packaging of 
foods may have a higher demand, but basic foodstuffs have real limits.^ 
Therefore, it is not against the interest of the net exporters for devel­
oping nations to become self sufficient. This does not imply that they 
will no longer import food, the Law of Comparative Advantage would still 
operate. It merely indicates that they are capable of feeding them­
selves. At this point, it is instructive to point out that the largest 
buyers of food are the industrialized nations (Europe, The Soviet Uniong
and Japan), who at one time had to learn to feed themselves.
It is in the interest of the world community to ensure the food 
security and development of the LDCs. The INA as an integrated nutri­
tion agency can do much to realize that goal of LOG self sufficiency in 
food. First, as a decentralized body the agency can prove much more 
sensitive to the needs and priorities of the individual areas (Regional 
Offices). Currently, decisions are made at headquarters that are con­
siderably removed form the concerns of the local areas. Having Regional 
Offices that have decision-making powers will bring the agency much 
closer to the local situation. Further, there will be more flexibility 
to adapt to the individual cultures and perceptions which creat barriers 
to nutrition improvement. Programs that evolve out of a central author-
^Charles B. Shuman, "Food Aid and the Free Market", Food Policy, 
Brown and Shue, ed., (New York, The Free Press, 1977): 145-63
and Paarlberg, "Coping", p. 373
8Robert L. Paarlberg, "Shifting and Sharing Adjustment Burdens," 
International Organinzation, 32, (Summer 1978): 657-8
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ity are necessarily inflexible to provide a sufficient amount of control 
and evaluation. The politics of the seven regions are manageable within 
the regions and will result in concepts that will be much more conducive 
to local needs.
Second, as a consolidation of the current programs the INA will do 
much to eliminate overlap and neglect. The most important function of 
the INA in the area of distribution will be coordination. The techni­
cians and administrators should be allowed a sufficient amount of flex­
ibility to prescribe and enact distribution programs suitable to their 
location. The RO should primarily make sure that all areas in need are 
at least analyzed so that priorities may be set. Beyond this, in the at­
mosphere of participatory management, field operations should be allowed 
the decretion to carry out programs. The RO will be responsible for 
oversight and evaluation but not to the point of becoming burdensome to 
the effort. After all, ultimate responsibility for evaluation belongs 
to the Oversight Committee.
The INA must strive to keep to the central objectives, i.e., im­
mediate food security, allowing development as soon as possible. Iron­
ically, it must also endeavor to make its mission eventually obsolete. 
There is no sense in creating a bureaucracy that will create new bureau­
cracies as in the case of current efforts. The agency is not an end in 
itself but a device to improve the situation in the global food regime 
so that it will be able to go out of business (the INA, that is).
Prospects
First of all, sucess depends on commitment by member states. This
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aspect cannot be overemphasized. It must clearly be the objective of the 
members to eliminate substantial world hunger. This commitment cannot be 
merely "paying lip service" to what sounds like a wonderful thing to do. 
Resolving world hunger cannot be considered strictly a highly moral act; 
it must be understood as an act in every nation's interest. Population 
and nutrition crises could very well prove to be incentives for initia-
9tion of the final calamity. It is not logical for a rich nation to 
cause massive destruction - it has too much to lose. It may appear 
logical for a poor nation that has no hope to improve its lot to initiate 
a holocaust - it has nothing to lose. Keeping these factors in mind, the 
community of nations must resolve that feeding the world's hungry is an 
objective of paramount importance.
There are those that claim that there is no way to feed the world's 
population. Even if enough food is produced now the population growth 
dynamics will prevent us from being able to feed everyone in a few 
y e a r s . T h e r e  are even some who advocate usage of "triage" as an inter­
national food policy. This would mean providing food assistance only to 
those nations that will survive once receiving it. The nations that will 
survive anyway and those that will not survive, even with assistance, 
would not receive aid. This approach to world food assumes two glaring 
fallacies. First, it assumes that carrying capacity for humans as with 
animals cannot be altered substantially. The carrying capacities
9U.S. Department of State, Development Assistance for the Third 
World (Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, March 
19, 1982)
^^Donella H. Meadows, et al, The Limits to Growth, (New York, Uni­
verse, 1972)
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£or Japan and the Netherlands have been increased several times over due 
to human technologies. Although imperialism was a factor in their ini­
tial growth, that factor was removed after World War II and both have 
grown since 1945 although both were destroyed. How can anyone assume 
that this will not be the case for other nations? Is it impossible for 
the nations considered non-survivors to improve their status with some 
technological alterations? The second fallacy is that the nations can 
be grouped into the three categories. This division will be based on 
artifical geographical boundaries. Areas of stark poverty or marginal 
sustenance run across borders. No nation could correctly be entirely 
placed in one of the groups. An even more absurd assumption would be 
that someone would be in the position to make the decision as who goes 
where! "Lifeboat ethics" as it is often called, is not only barbarous 
but lacks credulity. It is the responsibility of reasonable people to 
feed the world’s hungry.
Many economists have expressed concern over the unavoidable
11phenomenon of dependency. Their claim is that any foreign aid that 
takes the form of material concessions is counterproductive to devel­
opment. This has been a common theme and the recent conservative trends 
in the industrial nations has added to the popularity of dependency 
theory. Dependency must be properly divided into two groups, sensitiv­
ity dependence and vulnerability dependence. Sensitivity implies that 
a nation is affected by the policies of another nation but no severe
^^Helge Ole Bergensen, "A New Food Regime: Necessary but Impos­
sible," International Organizational, 34, (Spring 1980): 241
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repercussions would be faced if the nation had to alter its economy to
adjust to the change in any substantial manner. Vulnerability implies
that actions in one nation will drastically harm the dependent nation
and have sufficient enough impact to directly affect policy in the lat-
12ter nation, to the point of dictating policy. The type of dependence 
created by direct aid as described, would fall more under the heading 
of sensitivity dependence than vulnerability dependence. The food aid 
is received on a year-by-year basis. Removal of the aid would not 
seriously affect the policies of the recipeint nation. Since the aid 
will not be permanent and since there will be no political strings 
attached, there is no undue leverage over the recipient nations’ 
internal policies. Therefore no compulsion to alter policy would be 
likely if the amount of food to be given is altered. The INA will tar­
get food only where production and importation at reasonable cost could 
not meet demand. This would preclude setting national policy that 
anticipates aid since receipt of the aid could not be known in advance. 
The strongest argument to the possibility of dependency is the nature of 
the agency itself. Sensitivity dependency is based on bilateral rela­
tions between nations. The INA is centered around an international co­
operative atmosphere. The recipient nations will be able to influence 
policy enough to prevent the unreasonable or politically-motivated with­
drawal of aid. The distribution of food will be based on absolute need 
not on loyalty. Further, the distribution of food to all that need it
12Charles A. Baldwin, ’’Interdependence and Power: A Conceptual
Analysis,’’International Organization, 34, (Autumn 1980): 489-91
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will not be capable of providing so much food that a recipient nation 
will be better off without development. The design of the program is 
to allow for transition to a developed economy not a situation for 
development. This is not to say that there will be no dependence 
at all, but that the intensity of it can be minimized.
The most profound drawback to the INA is the need to surrender 
a small amount of national sovereignty. This is the one area that 
member states will least likely be willing to cooperate with. In 
order for the INA to function member states must be willing to allow 
the agency to control concessionary supplies. This is not an 
attractive notion to those that currently gain the most from distri­
bution policies. It may be seen by some nations as the removal of 
a diplomatic tool from their options. The most frustrating aspect of 
international problem-solving is the lack of international cooperation. 
Nations are willing to come together and discuss but they are rarely 
willing to commit themselves to any binding agreements. Nationalism 
is the archrival to any international cooperation. All of the world 
reserves the right to do what they please, when they please, providing 
they have the power. The most discouraging prospect of resolving the 
global food problem is that it will probably take a global food catas­
trophe to bring the nations of the world to commit themselves to 
create the International Nutrition Agency.
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CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The global problem of hunger is reaching crisis proportions. An 
increasing number of the world's population faces hunger each year.
This is a function of population growth and production shortages in 
the developing world. The U.S. and other food surplus nations have 
been exporting increasing amounts of food over the last 30 years. 
However, it is not expected that international food transfer from 
these nations will be able to cope with the dilemma of hunger much 
beyond the year 2000.
The most desirable solution to this predicament is increased 
production on the part of the Less Developed Countries (LDCs) .
However, such an increase is no simple matter. There are a number of 
obstacles to be overcome before any gains may be made. These impedi­
ments are social/political as well as technical. Among the social/ 
political barriers are such things as the need for land reforms, the 
improvement of internal distributive procedures and the need for nu­
trition education. These concerns must be resolved by each nation in 
a manner most acceptable to their cultural norms. There should be no 
imposition of solutions on these nations by the richer nations. Not 
only because it would be a violation of their sovereign rights but 
because such an approach cannot work. Time must be given these nations 
to resolve their own problems. On the technjcal end, there is an equal 
need for reform. Labor-intensive, not energy-intensive, methods of 
agriculture must be developed. There is a shortage of energy re­
sources and thus using western technological methods would be inappro­
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priate. There is also a need to improve tropical agricultural technol­
ogy. Since most of the developing nations are in tropical climates, 
application of temperate practices is not a solution to the LDC needs. 
There is a need therefore, for research and development in tropical 
practices. Resolution of both aspects of the problem of LDC production 
will take time. Consequently, temporary measures are needed to 
provide food to the needy nations until they are able to feed them­
selves .
The problem in the short run that must be resolved is food dis­
tribution. The current distribution process has proven ineffective. 
Distribution of food is conducted through two channels - commercial 
and concessionary. Until 1974, these channels were substantially 
controlled by the United States. After 1974, the U.S. was no longer 
able to control international distribution efforts. Inflation of 
prices and large purchases of food by the industrial nations pre­
vented LDC access to surplus stocks. Thus in 1974 the world hunger 
problem faced a new crisis. The foodstuffs that had been available 
to the Third World in the postwar era had been reduced significantly 
and the U.S. was unable or unwilling to do anything about it. It 
became apparent to many in the nutrition field that a new approach 
was needed to internationl distribution efforts. Many proposals for 
an international food storage program were made. These proposals 
never got beyond the discussion plinse.
Reforms remain a necessary step in the resolution of distri­
butional problems. These reforms should have the following elements:
1. A clear priority to humanitarian purposes must be set.
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2. Food aid should serve the development goals of the recipient 
nations.
• 3. Food aid should be channeled through multinational responses 
to hunger.
4. New standards for determination of aid must be set.
5. The distribution program must be temporary.
6. The distribution program must be closely monitored and have
specific incremental goals.
These guidelines establish the need to reform present international 
efforts.
The international bodies that currently administer nutrition 
enhancement programs have failed to alleviate the dilemma of world 
hunger. The most obvious reason for this is the large numbers of 
agencies involved in the effort with no central planning. This 
impediment to world efforts has been repeatedly cited by world leaders 
and international food bodies including the FAQ and the WFP. During 
the 1974 World Food Conference there were specific calls for initia­
tion of a concerted effort to improve distributional channels. How­
ever, no reforms have come out of these calls to action.
A closer look at the international agencies reveals the need for
a new approach the problem of hunger. International agencies perform 
four basic functions in nutrition enhancement - collection and dissem­
ination of information, provision of goods and services, financing and 
coordination of national efforts. Although these functions would appear 
to do much to improve the nutritional welfare of the world, recent 
failures have highlighted the shortcomings of these international ef-
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forts. The deficiencies of the international agencies may be grouped 
into two major areas, organizational and political. Organizational 
problems include: poor coordination, vague delineation of authority,
inadequate review and evaluation, people limitations and international 
- national relationships. The political areas of concern may be broken 
down into three areas - policy vacuums, knowledge gaps and priority 
gaps.
On a more administrative note there are also problems that are 
generally inherent to international agencies. These are more along 
managerial lines but are serious barriers to effective administration 
of nutrition efforts. These concerns are; the conflicts within the 
authority structure, personnel morale and management practices.
There are some unique problems inherent to international public 
administration that must be considered. These problems and the others 
attributed to international efforts at nutrition enhancement can be 
significantly abated through an ambitious reorganization.
As a response to the situation described above a new organization 
- the International Nutrition Agency - is proposed. Some of the ele­
ments of the INA that will improve nutrition efforts are as follows:
1. Separation of the INA from the United Nations as a method of 
dépoliticizing the nutrition enhancement process.
2. Decentralization of the INA by imparting responsibilities to 
the Regional Offices.
3. Establishment of an Oversight Committee to maintain a constant 
process of review and evaluation.
4. Organization of the Technical Coordinating Committee and the
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Regional Offices into a matrix management structures. This will 
require considerable dialogue between the technical and administra­
tive segments of the organization.
5. Selection of leadership centered around the ability of individ­
uals in the nutrition field. Further, a rotation process that will 
account for ideological as well as regional diversity.
6. Inclusion of members of private organizations and agricultural 
business in the agency to ensure their cooperation and ability to 
coordinate efforts.
These basic elements of the INA are intended to alleviate the general 
organizational and political shortcomings of the current efforts. 
Appendix B provides a breakdown of these problem areas and how the 
organization of the INA will dispense with these issues.
The budget of the INA will prove to be less expensive than the cur­
rent international structure involved in nutrition enhancement. The 
main reason that this can be accomplished is the reduction of the 
instance of duplication of effort. Since all programs in the various 
agencies will be brought together the administration of nutrition en­
hancement will be more cost effective. Further, the temporary, tar­
get nature of the INA will prove to be less expensive in the long run.
A firm objective and incremental planning will limit the amount of funds 
thnt member s La Les will be required to provide.
Human resource management within the INA presents some unique 
problems. First, the temporary nature of the INA would make it 
diffcult to recruit qualified personnel for the agency. A retirement 
plan will provide for the financial security of the staff members. The
lüA
basis of such a system will be much like that of the U.S. Armed Services 
except that funds will be derived from investing contributions rather 
than continued liability after the twenty-year life of the agency. A 
management-by-objectives approach to management will be utilized to keep 
the staff members involved in the goal attainment of the agency. The 
diverse nature of the personnel requires that an on-going promotion of 
the personal, as well as theoretical, dynamics of the staff members be 
incorporated into the structure. MBO will do much to maintain the 
professional growth and flexibility of the organization.
The INA will provide a manageable system of international food 
distribution. The TCC under the guidelines of the quadrennially con­
vened World Food Conferences will negotiate concession food supplies 
as well as direct purchases of surplus foods. Once levels of food 
have been established the TCC will transfer supplies directly to the 
ROs. These levels will be set under basic percentage ranges mandated 
by the WFC. The TCC will lay out the specific annual percentages.
Food will then be delivered to the recipient nations through either 
transfer to local storage facilities or storage in the ROs facilities. 
This will depend on the ability of the recipient nation. It is as­
serted here that control over distributional aspects of nutrition, at 
least on the international level will be far more effective under the 
INA process.
The INA is a worthwhile endeavor for both food-deficit nations as 
well as food-surplus nations. For the food-deficit nations there will 
be a more reliable system of subsidizing their food supplies through 
importation. Food aid will less likely be attached to political
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strings. Their position in the global food regime will be greatly en­
hanced. First, they will be able to participate in the policy-setting 
process of food aid. Second, they may operate under reasonable expect­
ation as far as what they may expect in the area of food aid. This will 
enable them to plan more accurately their needs in advance. Prices will 
become more stable since all members will see it to their best interest 
to maintain them. Food surplus nations will benefit as well. First, 
the burden of balancing their domestic policies with the concerns of 
national security can be somewhat relieved. They will have the forum 
within the INA to negotiate food policy openly and with reasonable 
assurance that they will only be expected to contribute what they can. 
Second, the stabilization of prices will no longer be the sole response 
ibility of the United States. Third, the long term effect will be the 
avoidance of disaster when the U.S. will no longer be able to contribute 
large amounts of food to the rest of the world. Fourth, the United 
States and others will have a vessel to announce its generosity to the 
world. In the past, many instances of American assistance have gone 
substantially unnoticed. For example, American relief efforts to 
South American nations, especially Chile and Argentina, had been over­
shadowed by criticism of its political interference. This happened be­
cause there had been no potent international body to attest to its 
charitable initiative but there had been considerable public awareness 
of its failures due to activity in the General Assembly. The INA can 
prove to be a powerful ally in the formation of wor]d opinion toward 
the U.S. Finally, food-exporting nations will have a better idea as to 
where the food is going and the effectiveness of food distribution
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efforts since one agency will be responsible for overseeing the effort. 
The INA will prove effective as a coordinator and preventer of waste.
Overall, the concept of the INA will allow for a transition from 
a world dependent on mass-farming technologies to one of individual 
national self-sufficiency. This transition period is critical to the 
avoidance of the Malthusian nightmare. It is entirely impracticle 
to attempt to shift away from massive food aid without allowing for a 
period of transition. The world can feed its population if rational 
planning takes place.
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Production (cereals) 1000 metric tons
78 79 80
World 1595918 1553919 1545806
Africa 71836 66207 69841
North America 338236 355990 326952
(U.S.) 273258 299257 263736
South America 61743 63700 63817
Asia 617615 628539 640120
Europe 250919 240341 253068
Australia 25377 23318 14874
(USSR) 229438 174840 176211
Trade 100 metric tons 
Exports Imports
World 1870540 2041820 1838500 1962750
Africa 37881 32212 170440 160432
No. America 1136420 1199700 72992 81010
(U.S.) 939667 1029670 1761 2074
So. America 137071 152777 105812 115888
Asia 110704 126892 622139 703400
Europe 325165 336281 630169 630902
Australia 98106 154100 - -
(USSR) 24547 38831 234895 268501
Source: FAQ Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, Vol. No. 10
October 1980
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Problem Area Improvement by the INA
Organizational
poor coordination
vague delineation 
of responsibility
people limitations
international- 
national relation
The INA is centrally planned and its program 
overseen in its entirety by the TCC.
The INA receives its mandate from one authority- 
granting body - the WFC
Personnel are selected from the nutrition field 
and there is less need to satisfy political ame­
nities since the agency is removed from the UN.
The national governments are directly involved 
with the INA. Staff members on the committees 
come from those with a certain amount of ex­
pertise. Credibility of the agency is enhanced 
by participation of the member states in the 
whole process.
Political
policy vacuums
knowledge gaps
priority gaps
Policy is not entangled with the politics of the 
UN. Authority is clearly laid out by the WFC 
and the Oversight Committee ensures that all 
areas are considered.
The enhancement of dialogue between the tech­
nical/professional members and the administra­
tive members is provided for in the matrix 
structure. MBO will provide an atmosphere that 
lends itself to constant updating of methods.
The WFC establishes overall priorities and the 
TCC must operate under these guidelines. The 
INA has the ability to establish firm priorities. 
The mission of the INA is specific - distribu­
tion.
Administrative
conflicts within 
the authority
personnel morale
management prac
The INA has devices incorporated into the matrix 
and the OC to resolve all conflicts.. The WFC is 
the final authority.
The retirement and compensation systems are gen­
erous. The dynamics of MBO should help members 
to become identified with the agency and should 
help fill their culture conflict.
MBO and the matrix will keep the dynamics of the 
INA from stagnating.
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